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Lilburn in Uniform? A Charter Analysis of
"Ordered Statements" Under the R.C.M.P. Act
Craig S. MacMillan*
R.C.M.P. officers can be ordered to respond in an internal investigation. Although the
statements are not to be used in any proceeding, no derivative use immunity is
proscribed. Several constitutional questions are raised: the right against seifincrimination, the right to silence, the right to counsel, and the right against arbitrary
detention. Recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Canada on disclosure and
impeaching credibility may also invalidate the legislative exclusion of ordered statements
in subsequent proceedings. Particularly when ordered statements are sanctioned as
interrogative powers at the investigative stage, the failure to provide derivative use
immunity leaves ordered statements constitutionally suspect.

Les agents de la G.R.C. peuvent recevoir l'ordre de repondre aux questions posies !ors
d'une enquete interne. Mais !es declarations faites ne peuvent pas etre utilisees dans
d'autres poursuites judiciaires, aucune exception d'usage administratif ou criminel est
prescrite. Plusieurs questions d' ordre constitutionnel sont soulevees: le droit contre
!'auto-incrimination, le droit au silence, le droit de consulter un avocat, et le droit contre
la detention arbitraire. Des declarations recentes par la Cour Supreme du Canada sur la
revelation et la reclusion de la cridibilite peuvent aussi invalider l' exclusion legislative
des declarations obtenues "sous ordre" dans des proces subsequents. Particulierement
lorsque les declarations sont obtenues sous ordre de repondre et sanctionnees en tant
qu'autorites interrogatrices au niveau de l'enquete. L'omission de fournir a ces
declarations ainsi donnees l' exemption d'usage derive laisse suspecte leur validite
constitutionnelle.

* Dalhousie Law School, LLB. anticipated 1993. The author wishes to thank Mr. John
Pearson (Director of Public Prosecutions for Nova Scotia) for his supervision.

94

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

"I am not willing to answer you any more of these questions because I see
you go about this examination to ensnare me; for seeing the things for
which I am imprisoned cannot be proved against me you will get other
matters out of my examination; and therefore .. .! shall answer no
more; ... and of any other matter that you have to accuse me of, I know it is
warrantable by the law of God, and I think of the law of the land, that I
may stand upon my just defence and not answer to your interrogations." 1
- John Lilburn before the Court of the Star Chamber, (1637).
"What we can do as a result of the ordered statement - and even this
causes us problems from time to time before the courts and with members
- is go out and get what you might call independent evidence." 2
- R.C.M.P. Commissioner, R.H .. Simmonds, before the
House of Commons Legislative Committee, (1985).
For police officers, the statement of Mr. Lilburn before the Court of the Star
Chamber, over three hundred and fifty years ago, encapsulates one of the
contemptible features of ordered statements: the obligation of officers to
incriminate themselves by responding to questions. As a corollary, the former
Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. adeptly highlights the second: ordered statements
enable the Force to acquire evidence that can be used against the officer. Given
this background, it is unusual that the function and validity of "ordered
statements" has escaped both judicial and academic scrutiny in relation to the

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 3
The purpose of this paper is to examine the constitutional validity of the
1986 amendments to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act' relating to the
internal investigation of alleged misconduct by R.C.M.P. officers. In particular,
the focus will be upon s. 40 of the R. C.M. P. Act (Part IV "Discipline"), that sets
out the procedure for investigating an alleged contravention of the Code of
Conduct. 5 Section 40(1) of the Act directs an officer or member in charge of a
detachment to institute an internal investigation where it "appears" that a

1 Lilburn's Trial (1637-45), 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (Star Chamber) at 1318, cited in R.S.M.
Woods, Police Interrogation (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 59.
2 Canada, House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-65, An Act to Amend the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, Minutes of
Proceedings and Evidence, Issue no. 7(27 November 1985) at 7: 16.
3 Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c.11 [hereinafter the Charter].
4 R.S.C. 1985, c. R-10 as am. by R.S.C. 1985, c. 8 (2nd Supp.), s. 16 enacting Part IV,
inter alia [hereinafter R. C.M.P. Act]; c. R-10 was in principle a re-enactment of the
revised statute of 1970 until amended by c. 8.
5 The Code of Conduct is found in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations,
1988, S.O.R./88-361 and sets out the standards of conduct and duties for members of the
R.C.M.P.
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member has contravened (or is contravening) the Code of Conduct. Section
40(2) states:
In any investigation under subsection (1), no member shall be

excused from answering any question relating to the matter
being investigated when required to do so by the officer or
other member conducting the investigation on the ground that
the answer to the question may tend to criminate the member
or subject the member to any proceeding or penalty.
In other words, during an internal investigation the officer under inquiry is
required to answer any questions that relate to the investigation. Refusing to
comply with a lawful order is an offence under s. 40 of the Code of Conduct.
The internal investigation is distinct from a criminal or statutory investigation
wherein the officer can exercise the right not to provide a statement. Of course,
given the fact that the officer can be ordered internally to answer questions may
make this right somewhat transparent.
Section 40(3) of the R.C.M.P. Act purports to privilege any ordered
disclosure by stating that "[n]o answer or statement made in response to a
question described in subsection (2) shall be used or receivable in any criminal,
civil or administrative proceeding." This measure is to protect the police officer
by preventing the formal introduction of the ordered statement into evidence in
any subsequent proceeding. In other words, the section provides the statement
with a "use immunity." Any evidence derived from the statement is not
protected, however, and can be used at a subsequent proceeding. Thus, the
officer is not afforded "derivative use immunity" under the Act.
In general, proponents of the ordered statement6 justify this mechanism
functionally; police management has a right to demand an accounting from its
employees. 7 Nonetheless, critics of the "ordered statement" argue that such a
measure is unnecessary, and violates the police officer's right to silence and
right to be free from self-incrimination. 8 Concerns have also surfaced about the
6

Also referred to as "duty," "required" and "accountability" statements; see C. Lewis, S.
Linden & J. Keene, "Public Complaints Against Police in Metropolitan Toronto - The
History and Operation of the Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner" (1986), 29
Crim. L. Q. 115; J.R. Hudson, "Police Review Boards and Police Accountability" (1971),
36 Law and Contemporary Problems 515.
7 Canada, House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-65, An Act to Amend the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, Minutes of
Proceedings and Evidence, Issue no. 11 (I 0 December 1985), at 11: 114. Commissioner
Simmonds stated that it is not " ... unreasonable to expect an accountability statement from
a member of the force as to what he has done during his tour of duty."
8 Ibid. at 11: 113-115. See also: House of Commons Debates (September 1985) at 10511.
Svend Robinson Member of Parliament, argued for abolition of the ordered statement.
Supra note 6. Lewis et al., discuss the concerns of officers in this regard.
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use of ordered statements as a means to obtain (to use former R.C.M.P.
Commissioner Simmond's term), "independent evidence" (or "derivative
evidence"9), upon which an investigation can be furthered. The Force could
then charge the officer for a statutory or internal conduct offence. In effect, s. 40
permits the Force to expedite a criminal investigation under the guise of an
internal investigation.
Without question, the ordered statement is a controversial measure in the
police profession. The validity of such a mechanism, however, has not been the
subject of a Charter analysis, probably for two reasons. First, changes in the
R. C.M.P. Act were not instituted until 1986, at which time the requirement to
give a statement became explicit in legislation. 10 Second, in 1987, the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Wigglesworth 11 raised the threshold regarding the
applicability of the Charter to "private, domestic or disciplinary matters which
are regulatory, protective or corrective and which are primarily intended to
maintain discipline." 12 Thus, the protections contained in s. 11 of the Charter
are not available unless a true criminal proceeding is involved or a conviction
would lead to a "true penal consequence." 13 This decision severely curtails the
basis upon which anyone subject to internal disciplinary proceedings can invoke
certain constitutional protections. For instance, in the case of ordered
statements, it appears that the police officer cannot refuse to answer questions by
relying on any of the procedural protections outlined under s. 11 of the Charter.
The recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Canada in Thomson
Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Dir. of Investigations and Research), 14 however,
may have a significant impact on the continued viability of ordered statements in
relation to s. 7 of the Charter. The Court disagreed fundamentally on the
constitutionality of the Combines Investigation Act15 provision that required a
person to attend and answer questions before the Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission. The decision offers an important theoretical analysis of the extent
to which self-incrimination, the right to silence, and the use of derivative
R.J. Marin (Pres.), Commission of Inquiry Relating to Public Complaints, Internal
Discipline and Grievance Procedures within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976) [hereinafter the Marin Commission]; see also, supra

9

note 8, Robinson, Legislative Committee Minutes, 11: 113-15.
10 Ibid. at 11:113-115. See also: supra note 7. Lewis et al discuss the concerns of officers
in this regard.
11 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541 [hereinafter Wigglesworth].
12 Ibid. at 560, Wilson, J.
13 Ibid. at 559.
14 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, 76 C.R. (3d) 129 [hereinafter Thomson Newspapers cited to
S.C.R.]. s. 8 of the Charter was also in issue, but will not form part of this analysis.
15 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, s. 17 (nows. 19) [further references will be to this enactment];
continued under the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34.
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evidence are interdependent and protected under s. 7 of the Charter. This forms
one of the foundations for evaluating the validity of s. 40(2) of the R. C.M.P. Act.
In addition, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Kuldip 16 on the use of testimony in previous judicial proceedings, and R. v.
Stinchcombe 17 discussing disclosure requirements, raise questions regarding the
purported veil created bys. 40(3) of the R.C.M.P. Act. As will become evident,
officers may be ill-advised to rely on s. 40 to prevent the use of their statements
or their contents in a proceeding.
The integral relationship of statutory and internal investigations will be
critical in determining if there is a constitutional basis upon which to question
the validity of ordered statements. Despite the statutory compartmentalization
of the various investigations under the R.C.M.P. Act, a criminal investigation
frequently proceeds concurrently with the internal matter. Thus, reference to the
possible criminal implications that are attached to an ordered statement will be a
recurring theme throughout this paper. In the end, the issue is whether the
Charter will permit an officer to refuse to answer any questions, or in the
alternative, whether any constitutional restriction on the use of derivative
evidence exists.

SECTION 11 OF THE CHARTER AND INTERNAL DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS
The Wigglesworth Case 18
Before 1986, a member of the R.C.M.P. convicted of a "Major Service Offence"
under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act19 was subject, by virtue of s.
36(1), to one or more of the following punishments: a term of imprisonment not
exceeding one year; a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars; loss of pay for a
period not exceeding thirty days; reduction in rank; loss of seniority or
reprimand. Punishment for a "Minor Offence" under s. 36(2) could include:
confinement to barracks for a period not exceeding thirty days; dismissal and
fine not exceeding three hundred dollars; fine not exceeding fifty dollars; and
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 618 [hereinafter Kuldip].
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
18 Supra note 11.
19 The provisions of R.S.C. 1970, c. R-9, were simply re-stated inc. R-10 of the 1985
revised statutes; s. 25 defined "major service offences," and s. 26 "minor offences." It
should be noted that members of the R.C.M.P. under s. 27 who had committed, were
l6

17

found committing, suspected of, or charged with a service offence were subject to arrest
under the Act. In addition, s. 28 permitted the Force to hold the member in custody until
trial for an internal offence. These invasive provisions were in place until amended in
1986 by c. 8.
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loss of seniority or reprimand.
Wigglesworth was an R.C.M.P. officer charged with common assault under
the Criminal Code 20 for slapping an "uncooperative" motorist during an
investigation for impaired driving. Prior to being tried on the assault, the officer
was charged, found guilty, and fined for a Major Service Offence by an
R.C.M.P. Service Court. At the subsequent criminal trial, the judge quashed the
common assault information under s. 24(1) of the Charter, reasoning that the
officer was being tried twice for the same misconduct, contrary to s. 1 l(h) of the
Charter. 21 The issue before the Supreme Court of Canada was whether the
conviction of Cst. Wigglesworth for the Major Service Offence precluded a
further trial under the Criminal Code, since the second proceeding would be a
violation of the right not to be tried twice for the same offence (commonly
known as double jeopardy), accorded bys. 1 l(h) of the Charter.
As noted by Eberts, Madame Justice Wilson adopted a clear "functional and
philosophical distinction between disciplinary matters and those proceedings
affecting society at large." 22 Writing for the majority, Wilson, J. found that
"[p]roceedings of an administrative nature instituted for the protection of the
public in accordance with the policy of a statute" were not the type of "offence
proceedings" to which s. 11 of the Charter applied. 23 The court envisioned two
circumstances in which someone can invoke s. 11: where the proceeding by "its
very nature .. .is a criminal proceeding," or, in a situation where a finding of guilt
"may lead to a true penal consequence." 24 A true penal consequence, for the
purposes of s. 11, occurs when the individual is subject to "imprisonment or a
fine which by its magnitude would appear to be imposed for the purpose of
redressing the wrong done to society at large rather than to the maintenance of
internal discipline." 25 In this regard, a factor in evaluating the true penal
consequence would be that service offence fines were paid to the R.C.M.P.,
instead of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the government. In any event, a
member of the R.C.M.P. was subject to imprisonment, thereby meeting the penal
consequences branch of the test.
In the end, however, Wigglesworth was not given the benefit of s. 1 l(h) of
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 245(1).
The Sask. Court of Queen's Bench disagreed and permitted an appeal, finding that the
assault and service offence constituted separate offences; see (1984), 38 C.R. (3d) 388
(Sask Q.B.). A further appeal to the Sask. C.A. was dismissed.
22 M. Eberts, "Section 7 of the Charter Plus Natural Justice: An Administrative Justice
Section 11," 101 at 106 in N.R. Finkelstein and B.M. Rogers, eds., Administrative
Tribunals and The Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1990).
23 Wigglesworth, supra note 11 at 560.
24 Ibid. at 559.
25 Ibid. at 561.

20
21
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the Charter, because the majority, following the distinction in Kienapple v. The
Queen, 26 found he was not being tried for the same offence. The Major Service
Offence was an internal accountability matter, whereas the criminal offence was
to "account to society at large" for his conduct. 27 In dissent, Estey, J. postulated
that the protection of s. 11 could arise if the conviction before the first tribunal
was performed as part of a legislated task that permitted a penalty recognizing
the "general public's interest in the administration of criminal law ... over and
above the limited interest of internal discipline." 28
A trilogy of police discipline cases from Ontario, 29 reported at the same time
as the Wigglesworth decision, removed any lingering doubt that s. 11 of the
Charter is inapplicable to "domestic, internal or disciplinary matters which are
of a regulatory nature designed to maintain discipline and professional
integrity. " 30

Legislative Developments

In the aftermath of Wigglesworth, it is evident that the Supreme Court had
promulgated a test which restricts severely, if not eliminates, the application of
the protections enshrined in s. 11 of the Charter to the administrative-discipline
process. Although the Supreme Court found that s. 11 was available in
Wigglesworth, the R. C.M.P. Act was the subject of several significant changes,
one of which was the removal of the fine and imprisonment provisions contained
in the earlier Act. These former punishments were replaced by a two tier
remedial disciplinary system wherein a member can be dealt with either by an
"Informal Disciplinary Action," or a "Formal Disciplinary Action," depending
on the gravity and surrounding circumstances of the Code of Conduct
contravention.
26

[1975] I S.C.R. 729 [hereinafter Kienapple].
Wigglesworth supra note 11 at 566.
28 Ibid. at 570.
29 The Supreme Court of Canada found in Burnham v. Metropolitan Toronto Police,
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 572 (sub nom. Burnham v. Ackroyd) thats. I l(d) of the Charter
(independence and impartiality of a tribunal) did not apply to Police Act R.S.O., c. 381 as
per Reg. 791 R.R.O. 1980 (creating the Code of Offences) disciplinary proceedings
involving "discreditable conduct" because they were not "criminal in nature nor did they
involve penal consequences" (Wilson, J. at 575). The Ontario legislation governing
police did not have imprisonment provisions. The independence and impartiality of police
disciplinary tribunals was also challenged under s. 1l(d) of the Charter in Trumbley &
Pugh v. Metropolitan Toronto Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 577 (sub nom. Re Trumbley) and
Trimm v. Durham Regional Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 582 with the same result- i.e. s. 11
did not apply to the forum of internal/domestic discipline.
30 W.J. Atkinson, "The Independence and Impartiality of Administrative Tribunals After
the Charter" in Finkelstein and Rogers, eds., supra note 22, 87 at 93.
27
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Under s. 41(1) of the R.C.M.P. Act, informal disciplinary action can consist
of counselling, special training, professional counselling, recommendation for
transfer, close supervision, forfeiture of time off not exceeding one day, and
reprimand. In accordance with s. 45.12(3), where an Adjudication Board (the
internal discipline proceeding) decides that a Code of Conduct contravention is
established, it can impose any one or more of the following sanctions: dismissal,
direction to resign, demotion, forfeiture of pay for a period not exceeding ten
work days, and any of the informal actions noted above. 31 These amendments
have removed the "true penal consequences" that existed under the previous
scheme, thereby ensuring thats. 11 of the Charter will not apply to the R.C.M.P.
disciplinary process.
Another consideration in the application of s. 11 of the Charter to ordered
statements is the condition that the person be "charged with an offence". Even
if the internal disciplinary offence was one that met either the criminal or true
penal consequences branch for the inurance of s. 11, in many cases the officer
will not have been "charged" with an offence, because most ordered statements
will be required at the pre-charge or investigative stage. Therefore, under s.
ll(c) of the Charter, there is no basis to assert that the officer "cannot be
compelled to be a witness in proceedings against" that officer. The significance
of distinguishing between a testimonial and investigative compulsion was
understood even prior to the decision in Wigglesworth. As R.C.M.P.
Commissioner Simmonds observed before the Legislative Committee dealing
with the proposed changes to the R.C.M.P. Act, s. 11 would not apply to ordered
statements because the member would not be "charged." 32 Thus, the term
"proceedings" has been limited to "compelled testimony," and, has not been
judicially extended to prevent conscription at the investigative stage of offences.
Protecting persons at the investigative stage has, in part, been assumed in the
right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter. 33
These limits underscore the artificial distinction made in the application of
s. 11 not only to police, but also all disciplinary proceedings in general. Rogers
has concluded that:
In some cases there is a variance in the sanction based on the rank of the member.
"Officers" (i.e. commissioned rank) are only recommended for demotion or dismissal by
the Board, while non-commissioned officers can be demoted (Inspectors and Constables
are excepted from demotion under subsection (5)); sees. 2 for definitions.
32 Supra note 2 at 11:115.
33 Thomson Newspapers, supra note 14. See also, R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.CR. 151
[hereinafter Hebert]; R. v. Esposito (1985), 53 0.R. (2d) 356 (Ont. C.A.) [leave to appeal
to the S.C.C. refused 65 N.R. 244] where the court specifically found thats. 1l(c) of the
Charter only applies to being compelled to testify and has no application to "questioning"
by the police.

3l
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[S]imply pinning labels of "administrative" or "criminal" on
impugned conduct is not the way for courts to proceed. What
is called for is a careful examination of the conduct itself and
the rights affected, within the particular statutory scheme. 34
A review of the current R. C.M.P. Act does not disclose any investigational
conditions on the use of ordered statements, other than the invocation of an
internal investigation. The mere fact that the authority to order an officer to give
a statement is limited to an "investigation" under s. 40(1) is little assurance this
mechanism could not be used improperly.
Asserting that an ordered statement can only be used during internal
investigations, which may result in an Adjudication Board hearing, belies the
fact that a criminal investigation may also be underway, followed by an
R.C.M.P. Public Complaints Commission (an independent-civilian review)
investigation or public inquiry or both.35 In addition, a "Board of Inquiry" may
be struck by the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. or the Solicitor General under s.
24.1 to "investigate and report on any matter connected with the organization,
training, conduct, performance of duties, discipline, efficiency,
administration ... of the Force or affecting any member" (emphasis added). It is
also possible that the officer may have a "grievance" relating to the actions of
the Force, which may ultimately have to be resolved by a hearing before the
R.C.M.P. External Review Committee, by authority of s. 34(4) of the R.C.M.P.
Act. Although varying levels of protection are offered, in all instances,
testimony before the Board of Inquiry, the P.C.C., and the E.R.C. is required,
irrespective of any incrimination. Of course, the member may also be the
subject of a civil suit.
The context in which the ordered statements operate is extremely
complicated. Eberts illuminates the complexity and unsettled nature of
administrative procedures in general:
There exists nowhere in administrative law any formal
mechanism for determining an order of precedence among
these various kinds of proceedings, for preventing abuse of

34 B.M. Rogers, "Charter Limits on Administrative Investigative Powers," in Finkelstein
and Rogers, supra note 22, 129 at 130.
35 Part VI of the R.C.M.P. Act established the P.C.C., which, if not satisfied with the
Force's disposition of a complaint, may, by virtue of s. 45.42(3)(c), investigate a public
complaint or institute a public hearing to inquire into the complaint. See also, the "Public
Complaints Against the RCMP" brochure (Canada: Supply and Services, 1988);
R.C.M.P. P.C.C., Annual Report 1989-90 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1990).

102

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

multiplicity of proceedings, or for safeguarding the rights of a
respondent. 36
The constitutional door was not closed in Wigglesworth, however, as
Wilson, J. declared that "constitutionally guaranteed procedural protections may
be available in a particular case under s. 7 of the Charter, although s. 11 is not
available." 37
GENERAL PROVISIONS REGARDING SELF-INCRIMINATION

In 1882, the Court of Queen's Bench in Lamb v. Munster, 38 found that the
common law recognized that persons were not required to answer any questions
during a civil discovery process for libel, if they swore that the answer may tend
to incriminate them in a criminal prosecution. The New Brunswick Supreme
Court, in 1963, affirmed that no person can be compelled to incriminate him or
herself at common law, and "[n]o abrogation or curtailment of the common law
privilege can be effected save through legislation couched in clear and explicit
terms." 39 Section 40(2) of the R.C.M.P. Act explicitly states that "no member
shall be excused from answering ... on the ground that the answer ... may tend to
criminate the member or subject the member to any proceeding or penalty."
There seems to be little doubt about the "explicit" nature of subsection (2).
Section 40(3) of the R. C.M.P. Act attempts to provide some redress for the
denial of the common law protection by proclaiming that an internal statement
will not be used in a criminal, civil or administrative proceeding (use immunity),
except where the member knowingly gives a false or misleading statement to the
investigator. 40
Supra note 22 at 105.
Supra note 11 at 562.
38 (1882-3) 10 Q.B.D. 110, (1881-85), All E.R. 465 (Q.B.).
39 Sweezy v. Crystal Chemicals Ltd. (1963), 50 M.P.R. 30 at 35 (N.B.S.C. A.D.). See
also, R. v. Amato, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 418; R. v. Jobidon [1991], 2 S.C.R. 714 at 736 per
Gonthier, J.
40 It should also be noted that s. 8(3) of the Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46

36
37

recognizes that common Jaw defences, justifications, and excuses are still available in
Canada, to the extent they remain unaltered and consistent with any Act of Parliament.
As noted by Gonthier, J., in R. v. Jobidon, supra note 39 at 736, there has been "little
judicial analysis of this section of the Code ... [and] the references made to it have
predominantly concerned exceptional circumstances which provide defences or which
deny certain features of an offence." Gonthier, J. (at 258) recognizes that s. 8(3) can
interact with the common law to develop "entirely new defences not inconsistent with the
Code" or to give meaning to justifications and defences, which may provide a basis to
argue that ordered statements or derivative evidence cannot be used in criminal
proceedings contrary to the common law. This seems possible given the fact that four
members of the Supreme Court concurred with Gonthier, J. while essentially reading a
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Section 40(2) resembles s. 5(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, 41 which states:
No witness shall be excused from answering any question on
the ground that the answer to the question may tend to
criminate him, or may tend to establish his liability to a civil
proceeding at the instance of the Crown or of any person
(emphasis added).
It is settled in Canada thats. 5(1) has abolished the common law privilege
of a "witness" (i.e. someone not charged) to refuse to answer questions in a
proceeding which may tend to incriminate. 42 As noted by Dickson, J. (as he then
was) in Marcoux & Solomon v. The Queen, the privilege against selfincrimination "extends to the accused qua witness and not qua accused, it is
concerned with testimonial compulsion specifically and not with compulsion
generally." 43 Since 1982, however, if the person is charged with a criminal
offence, s. 11 (c) of the Charter provides that the accused cannot be compelled to
be a witness and testify against him or herself in that proceeding. The "charged"
exception was also recognized earlier under s. 4(1) of the Canada Evidence Act.
The result, as noted by Schiff, is thats. 1 l(c) and s. 4(1), "give an accused
[charged] person the power to choose whether to testify" (emphasis added). 44
Section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act provides that a witness's
testimony cannot be used subsequently if the witness objects to the question. It
remains to be seen if questioning an officer qua suspect (i.e. not charged) in an
internal investigation will be a consideration for the court under s. 7 of the

Charter.
Section 2(d) of the Canadian Bill of Rights45 states that "no law of Canada
new intent into the assault provisions of the Criminal Code, which created a new offence;
for a comment see, S.J. Usprich, "Annotation" (1991), 7 C.R. (4th) 235. It would be open
to debate whether self-incrimination is a common law principle envisioned by s. 8(3);
nevertheless, it appears unassailable that s. 40(2) has abrogated the common law right not
to answer incriminating questions. Thus, to the degree that declining to answer is
inconsistent with the R.C.M.P. Act, the common law privilege or justification for not
answering would be nullified by the Criminal Code. In any event, it is clear that the
common law privilege against self-incrimination was to be abrogated by s. 40(2) of the
R.C.M.P. Act.
41

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
See e.g., R. v. Dubois, (1985] 2 S.C.R. 356 at 362, per Lamer, J. (as he then was). See
also Di Iorio & Fontaine v. Montreal Jail Warden, [1978] l S.C.R. 152 (sub nom. Di
Iorio & Fontaine v. Warden of the Common Jail of Montreal and Brunett), supra note 34,
Rogers at 135; M. Mcinnes, "The Right To Silence In the Presence of Anton Pillar: A
Question of Self Incrimination" (1987-88), 26 Alta. L.R. 332.
43 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 763 at 769.
44 S. Schiff, Evidence In The litigation Process, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (Toronto: Carswell, 1988)
at 946.
45 R.S.C. 1985, Appendix III.
42
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shall be construed or applied so as to ... authorize a court or tribunal, commission,
board or other authority to compel a person to give evidence if he is
denied ... protection against self crimination" (emphasis added). In Curr v. R. 46 ,
Laskin, J. (as he then was), declined to find a general right against selfincrimination beyond that set out in s. 2(d) of the Bill of Rights. Curr is
authority for the testimonial right against self-incrimination operating before a
criminal court, and for the proposition that any statutory provision compelling a
witness to testify must be accompanied by criminatory protection. 47 The Bill of
Rights has not figured prominently in the post-Charter era, 48 and given the
restriction in Curr making it consistent with the Canada Evidence Act, it is
evident that ordered statements would not be subjected to any meaningful
redress here.
The Charter states that any incriminating testimony by a witness cannot be
used in any subsequent proceedings. Unlikes. 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act,
s. 13 of the Charter provides protection for a witness's incriminatory testimony
without an objection by the witness. 49 The fundamental problem, of course, is
that neither provision extends beyond a "testimonial privilege," or in other
words, before the proceeding to the investigative stage. More importantly, as
Whitten points out, s. 13 of the Charter does not preclude the use of derivative
evidence. 50 Moreover, as will be seen, the courts have eroded the protection
provided in s. 13 by permitting the Crown to use previous testimony in a
subsequent proceeding to impeach credibility.
Distinctions Between Proceedings and Ordered Statements

It is clear that a witness can be compelled to appear before an administrative
board and provide testimony subject to exclusion in subsequent proceedings.
The testimony may, however, disclose damaging evidence that can lead to
serious consequences, such as criminal charges. Although there can be similar
consequences when disclosing derivative evidence, either before an
administrative proceeding or in an ordered statement (i.e. a charge), there are
three important distinctions. First, the ordered statement is not obtained in the
[1972] S.C.R. 889 at 910.
Ibid. at 912.
48 Although Beetz, J. did rely on the Bill of Rights in Singh v. Can. (Min. of Employment
and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, to strike down federal legislation dealing with the
immigration process that denied certain claimants a right to a full hearing, there has been
little judicial activity otherwise in this regard.
49 Section 13 states: "A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have
any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate the witness in any other
proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury."
50 A. Whitten, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (1986) 29 Crim. L.Q. 66 at 83.
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context of a "proceeding," which substantially alters the forum under
consideration. How is the internal investigator to be held accountable given the
non-existence of any external judicial review of the acquisition process? There
is neither a transcript of the process, (other than the statement), nor a public or
quasi-public nature to the procedure. There is no monitoring mechanism or
independent adjudicator to ensure the officer is receiving fair treatment. A
member of the R.C.M.P. can be the subject of an interrogation in a context
which is not even remotely associated with the limited "proceeding" safeguards
afforded by the Charter and Canada Evidence Act when a witness is called upon
to testify. Second, an internal investigation, and attending ordered statement,
can be instituted where it merely appears there has been a contravention of the
Code of Conduct. This threshold is very low. Third, under s. 40(1), the member
is not being questioned as a "witness,'' 51 he or she is under investigation as an
"accused" on the basis that it "appears" there has been a contravention of the
Code of Conduct. This distinction is even more striking when a criminal
investigation is in parallel to the disciplinary investigation.
SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER AND SELF-INCRIMINATION

The Criminal Context
Even before the Charter, the law was settled that a person charged with a
criminal offence could not be compelled to testify against him or herself at
trial. 52 This common law principle was further enshrined in the Charter. The
right not to be compelled to testify against one's self under s. 1 l(c) (ands. 4(1)
C.E.A.), however, is limited to persons charged in the criminal trial process.
The judicial distinction between the privilege against self-incrimination and
the right to silence is sometimes difficult to perceive. Without mentioning s. 7,
the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Esposito, 53 found that there is a common
law right to remain silent at both the investigative and trial stage of the criminal
process. Further, the right to silence, possessed by an accused person in the
criminal context, was proclaimed a "tenet of our legal system" in R. v.
Woolley. 54 Probably one of the clearer judicial statements regarding
incrimination and silence is found in R. v. Greig, where Dupont, J. of the
Ontario High Court asserted:
Supra note 2, Commissioner Simmonds advised the Legislative Committee on Bill C65 that the legal advice regarding the self-crimination provisions of s. 13 of the Charter
indicated that it did not apply to the member, as they were not a "witness."
52 R.E. Salhany, A Basic Guide to Evidence in Criminal Cases (Toronto: Carswell, 1990)
at 11. See also supra note l at 60.
53 Supra note 33 at 362.
54 (1988), 40 C.C.C. (3d) 531 at 539 (Ont. C.A.), Cory, J.A.
51
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The accused's common law right to remain silent, which is
historically linked to the presumption of innocence and the
right against self-incrimination, is one of the pillars of the
criminal justice system (emphasis added). 55
It was not until the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Hebert5 6 that
conclusive Charter guidance was provided about the right to silence and selfincrimination under s. 7. 57 The stage for an analysis of the right to silence and
incrimination had been set in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, 58 where Lamer, J.
interpreted the phrase "principles of fundamental justice." It was found that ss.
8 to 14 of the Charter were specific illustrations of the principles of fundamental

justice to be accorded in criminal and penal law under s. 7. 59 Lamer, J.
concluded in the B. C. Motor Vehicle Act reference that:
[T]he principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the
basic tenets and principles of our legal system, not only our
judicial process, but also of the other components of our legal
system .... [w]hether any given principle may be said to be a
principle of fundamental justice within the meaning of s. 7 will
rest upon an analysis of the nature, sources, rationale and
essential role of that principle within the judicial process and
in our legal system as it evolves. 60
Returning to Hebert, McLachlin, J. writing for the majority, reviewed the
jurisprudence on the right to silence. She concluded that s. 7 is founded on two
common law principles: the "confessions rule" (involuntary statements are
inadmissible), and, the "privilege against self-incrimination" (the accused is not
required to testify at trial). 61 Thus, a person "in the power of the state in the
course of the criminal process has the right to choose whether to speak to the
police or to remain silent." 62 It is on this basis that McLachlin, J.finds that:
From a practical point of view, the relationship between the
privilege against self-incrimination and right to silence at the
investigational stage is equally clear. The protection conferred
55
56

(1987), 56 C.R. (3d) 229 at 237.
Supra note 33.

Section 7 states: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice."
58 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 48 C.R. (3d) 289 (sub nom. Ref. Re Sec. 94(2) of Motor Vehicle

57

Act).
59 Ibid. at 502.
60 Ibid. at 512-513. See also, R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, wherein the court states

that legal principles can be reflected in legislative history.
Supra note 56 at 164.

61

62
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by a legal system which grants the accused immunity from
incriminating himself at trial but offers no protection with
respect to pre-trial statements would be illusory. 63
The court recognized "that an accused person has no obligation to give
evidence against himself... there is a right to choose." 64 The majority limited the
scope of the right to silence (the choice to speak to the authorities), as it relates
to police interrogation and the use of undercover operators, to that period of time
when the person is in detention. It was on this point that Sopinka and Wilson,
JJ. parted with the majority. Justice Wilson declared that if the purpose of the s.
7 right to silence were to be achieved:
[It] must arise whenever the coercive power of the state is
brought to bear upon the citizen ... this could well predate
detention and extend to the police interrogation of a suspect. 65
From this analysis, it is evident that the courts have evolved a right to
silence and non-incrimination in the criminal process that is triggered at the
moment an individual is "subjected to the coercive powers of the state," simply
by virtue of detention. 66 An interesting dilemma is created for the courts. A
police officer providing a statement under an "order" cannot leave the presence
of the investigating officer until such time as the questioning is completed, yet
the officer is being detained within the context of an "administrative" process,
and not the criminal process per se. The question is whether an internal
statement also provides the officer with a right to choose under s. 7 of the
Charter.
The Administrative Context

The Canadian judiciary has not always been comfortable with the witnessaccused dichotomy, particularly where an administrative inquiry can, for the
most part, be substituted for the criminal proceeding. For example, in Batary v.
A.G. of Saskatchewan, 67 the Supreme Court of Canada found that someone
charged with murder could not be compelled to attend and testify with respect to
the circumstances of the death at a coroner's inquest. Such testimony would
have enabled the prosecution to usurp the accused's privilege against
incrimination and right to silence. It was the view of Cartwright, J. that the
63

Ibid. at 174.
Ibid.
65 Ibid. at 190.
66 Broyles v. The Queen, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595 at 606 as per Iacobucci,i J. [hereinafter
Broyles]
67 [1965] S.C.R. 465, Cartwright, J.
64
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Canada Evidence Act did not have the effect of making an accused compellable
at an inquest. 68
Since 1892, the coroner's inquest has not been part of the criminal justice
structure in Quebec. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada in Faber v. The
Queen 69 found that individuals were compellable and examinable. In a five to
four judgment, the majority found that the coroner's inquiry was neither
concerned with the investigation of crime, nor was it a trial with an "accused,"
because the witness had not been charged. 70 The dissent, led by Pigeon, J., were
of the mind that the coroner's inquisition was not sufficiently delineated from
the criminal structure to find that it had no criminal jurisdiction, particularly
when the sole purpose was to determine who might be charged with the crime.
Two years later, the issue of compelling testimony before an administrativeinvestigative tribunal arose again in Di Iorio & Fontaine v. Montreal Jail
Warden, 71 where the appellants were found guilty of contempt and sentenced to
one year in gaol for refusing to testify before a commission of inquiry into
organized crime in Quebec. The Supreme Court found, based on Faber, that if
an inquiry can be held to determine who could be charged with murder, it would
be no less permissible to identify persons involved with organized crime.
Justice Dickson (as he then was), brusquely declared that "[w]hether or not one
agrees with a result which may force a person to assist in an investigation of his
criminal activity, the provisions of s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act ... compel
such a result." 72
In dissent, Laskin, C.J.C. expressed concern that the province, in the form
of an administrative commission, could do "wholesale" what the Criminal Code
did "retail." Although this analysis is premised on the division of powers in
relation to criminal law, there seems to be an implicit concern that the province
could use the administrative-investigatory mechanism to impose disclosure on
individuals in the criminal context. It is evident then, that prior to the Charter,
the Supreme Court was not receptive to a broad application of the privilege
against self-incrimination, despite the apparent discomfort this caused for some.
Early in the history of the Charter, however, Scheibe!, J. of the
68

The criminal law in force in Saskatchewan was that of England as it existed in 1870,
subject to any subsequent alterations or modifications by Parliament; in this case the
criminal law had not been amended, as it pertained to Saskatchewan, to permit the
examination of someone charged with murder by the coroner. Ibid. at 475-79.
69 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 9.
70
Ibid. at 33, de Grandpre, J.
71 Supra note 42. The primary issue, which is not as important here, was whether the
province was engaged in criminal law, thereby making the commission ultra vires and
unconstitutional under the division of powers.
n Ibid. at 222.

ORDERED STATEMENTS

109

Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench, included administrative proceedings in
his analysis of self-incrimination under s. 7. He stated in R.L. Crain Inc. v.
Couture & Restrictive Trade Practices Commission:
An administrative inquiry, on the other hand, may be directed
at uncovering illegal activity on the part of the witness. The
denial of that witness's privilege against self-incrimination in
this situation may result in the witness being compelled to
assist in an investigation into his criminal activity. 73
The British Columbia Court of Appeal disagreed with this approach, and, in
Haywood Securities Inc. v. Inter-Tech Resource Group Inc., 74 the majority found
that s. 7 of the Charter did not provide a general right against self-incrimination,
insofar as ss. l l(c) and 13 established the extent to which such protection would
be available.
In light of the Charter, new battle lines were drawn over the right of the
state to compel individuals or corporations to attend before an administrative
board to answer questions, even though such answers may incriminate the
person or provide the state with a tool to "discover" the evidence upon which a
charge could be laid. Since s. 11 rights were not necessarily applicable to quasicriminal or disciplinary proceedings (Wigglesworth), judicial clarification on the
nature of self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter was required.
The Thomson Newspapers Case

When faced with an opportunity to rule conclusively on the scope of the
right to silence and self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter in the quasicriminal process, the Supreme Court was unable elucidate a clear majority
judgment. In Thomson Newspapers ,75 the appellant newspaper was served with
orders to appear before the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to answer
questions and produce documents; the R.T.P.C. would thus be able to determine
whether evidence existed that the corporation had committed the indictable
offence of predatory pricing contrary to the Combines Investigation Act (now
Competition Act). 16
Both LaForest and L'Heureux-Dube, JJ. found thats. 7 of the Charter was
not violated. Sopinka and Wilson, JJ. held thats. 7 had been breached, and the
impugned measure was not saved under s. 1 of the Charter. Lamer, J. (as he
then was), found it was inappropriate to deal with s. 7 in this instance. This
73
74

(1983), 6 D.L.R. (4th) 478 at 512.
[1986] 2 W.W.R. 289.
75 Supra note 14.
76 Supra note 15.
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same division arose in Stelco Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), 71 which was decided at the
same time and involved the same issues and legislation.
Although LaForest, J. found that s. 7 can protect individuals from adverse
self-incriminatory results not covered by s. 13 ors. ll(c) of the Charter, any
such protection must be analyzed in the context of these sections. In his view,
an absolute right to refuse to answer questions would create a "dangerous and
unnecessary imbalance" between ihe rights of the individual and society. 78
Upon reviewing the "inquisitorial" nature of the process, and the fact that the
Canada Evidence Act has recognized for almost one hundred years that the
privilege of self-incrimination extends only to "testimonial immunity," (and not
derivative use immunity), LaForest, J. concluded that s. 7 does not extend to
"evidence derived from compelled testimony." 79 Justice LaForest asserted, by
analogy to the s. 24(2) exclusion analysis used under the Charter, that there is a
distinction between derivative evidence that exists independently of the
compelled testimony which could be discovered independent of the testimony
(i.e. the "real" evidence analysis) and evidence that would be virtually
undiscoverable without the incriminatory testimony (i.e. "conscripted"
evidence).
In response to the conscripted evidence scenario, LaForest, J. posited that
"undiscoverable" derivative evidence obtained from compelled testimony can, in
some cases, be excluded by the trial judge where its admission would "violate
the principles of fundamental justice" by creating an unfair trial. 80 Admission of
independently existing evidence does not affect the fairness of the trial, and as
such, any compelled testimony that identifies the evidence does not breach s. 7.
It is not explained how this ad hoc reliance on the common law rule of
exclusion for derivative evidence, obtained through self-incriminatory
testimony, coincides with the right not to be deprived of the protection of s. 7.
Justice L'Heureux-Dube, on the other hand, relied on the traditional witnesscharged dichotomy to find that s. 7 does not afford a constitutional right of
silence and non-incrimination for "witnesses." 81 In her view, the Charter has
not created an unassailable right against self-incrimination. Rather, it has
"preserved the division of the rules" 82 regarding witnesses and compellability
under ss. l l(c) and 13. With regard to derivative evidence, L'Heureux-Dube, J.
noted that the Canada Evidence Act never extended beyond the "actual
77
78
79
80
81
82

Supra note 14.
Thomson Newspapers, supra note 14 at 541.
Ibid. at 547-548.
Ibid. at 561.
Ibid. at 574.
Ibid. at 581.
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testimony" of the witness, and derivative evidence improperly obtained from an
accused in pre-Charter cases was routinely admitted. 83
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube concluded that "[t]here is no inflexible
rule that the admission of derivative evidence will affect the fairness of the
judicial process."84 As a result, s. 7 does not contain a derivative use immunity
in relation to witnesses compelled to appear before boards of inquiry and related
agencies. In the end, both LaForest and L'Heureux-Dube, JJ. find that it is not a
principle of fundamental justice that individuals be afforded a blanket immunity
from self-incrimination in these circumstances.
Conversely, Wilson, J. held that any discernment between an investigatory
versus prosecutorial process is "irrelevant when a criminal prosecution is a
potential consequence of the .. .investigation"85 (emphasis added). After
canvassing several Commonwealth jurisdictions ahd the United States, she
concluded that the only way to protect a person from being "conscripted" and
having derivative evidence utilized from an investigatory proceeding, is to
exclude such evidence. Wilson, J. rejected the s. 24(2) analogy:
[The discretion of the judge is] no guarantee of protection
against the use of derivative evidence obtained as a result of a
witness's compelled testimony .... exclusion must be a matter of
principle and of right, not of discretion. 86
The purpose of s. 7 is to protect witnesses from the use of derivative evidence in
any subsequent criminal proceeding, to the extent that ss. 1 l(c) and 13 are
unavailable. Madame Justice Wilson concluded that:
Where a person's right to life, liberty and security of the
person is either violated or threatened, the principles of
fundamental justice require that such evidence not be used in
order to conscript the person against himself (emphasis
added). 87
Turning to s. 1 of the Charter, Wilson, J. asserted that any legislative
measure that breaches a principle of fundamental justice will be almost
impossible to support as demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society 88 - which is her finding here.
In agreeing with the reasons of Wilson, J., Justice Sopinka observed that:
Ibid. at 581. See e.g.: R. v. Wray [1971] S.C.R. 272.
Thomson Newspapers, ibid. at 582.
85 Ibid. at 461.
86 Ibid. at 483.
87 Ibid. at 484.
88 Ibid. at 487.
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[The right to remain silent under s. 7] is a right not to be
compelled to answer questions or otherwise communicate with
police officers or others whose function it is to investigate the
commission of criminal offenses. The protection afforded by
the right is not designed to protect the individual from the
police qua [sic] police, but from the police as investigators of
criminal activity. 89
Lamer, J. was of the view that the wrong section of the legislation had been
challenged, as it was not the contempt punishment for a refusal to answer that
was in issue, but the enactment that ultimately removed the right to refuse to
answer under the common law. 90 He declined to pronounce on the s. 7 issue,
since this would by inference lead to a judicial statement on s. 5 of the Canada
Evidence Act. If this were known to the other Attorney Generals, there would
probably have been further interventions. Justice Lamer conditioned these
observations on the assumption that he agrees with Wilson, J. that it is a
principle of fundamental justice that a witness may refuse to give incriminating
testimony ..
The result, as described by Gold, is that compulsory state questioning
violates s. 7. Where testimony is compelled despite any objections over selfincrimination, s. 1 will require either subsequent use and derivative use
immunity (Justices Wilson, Sopinka, Lamer), or use and discretionary use
immunity (Laforest, J.) or use immunity only (L'Heureux-Dube, J.). 91
Extracting Commonalities

Where does this leave ordered statements? The first important
consideration is the entire panel in Thomson Newspapers agreed that ss. 1 l(c)
and 13 are not the final statement on the right to silence and self-incrimination.
Section 7 holds some "residual content" that extends to a situation not
contemplated by specific provisions of the Charter. Second, the court was
unanimous in finding that the appellants in Thomson Newspapers were subject
to a deprivation of liberty under s. 7. Third, the context and consequences of an
ordered statement may prove sufficiently troublesome for the court to provide an
impetus for re-alignment on self-incrimination. Fourth, it is an accepted
constitutional principle that either the purpose or effect (consequences) of a
legislative measure can breach the Charter. 92 It is on this basis that an
examination of the constitutional validity of ordered statements can be initiated.
89
90
91
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Ibid. at 603.
Ibid. at 443-444.
Gold, Annual Review of Criminal Law 1990 (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 93-94.
R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] I S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M Drug Mart].
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ORDERED STATEMENTS UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER
Is There A Deprivation of Liberty?
Does s. 7 of the Charter afford officers a right of silence and non-incrimination
during an internal investigation? Significant to this inquiry is the extent to
which a police officer can be compelled to incriminate him or herself, either by
ordered or derivative evidence. The first question is whether the officer is
subject to a deprivation of life, liberty or security by being required to provide a
statement? The Supreme Court agreed in Thomson Newspapers and Stelco that
compelling a person to attend before an investigative board involved a
deprivation of liberty within the meaning of s. 7 of the Charter. 93
Therefore, it can be asserted that a police officer is under administrative
"detention" when providing a required statement; failure to comply can subject
the officer to additional discipline under the Code of Conduct for disobeying an
order from a superior officer. 94 Justice LeDain in R. v. Therens, defined
"detention" withins. 10 of the Charter, to include situations where:
[A] police officer or other agent of the state assumes control
over the movement of a person by demand or direction which
may have significant legal consequences and which prevents
or impedes access to counsel 95 (emphasis added).
Is there a delineation to be made between an investigator of the internal and
statutory offence qua police? The internal investigator is acting under the
authority of an act of Parliament (R. C.M.P. Act). It is difficult to assert that the
internal investigator does not function as an "agent of the state," especially
where there is a legislated duty to investigate the allegation. Moreover, there is
a clear legal obligation on the officer to answer, and, significant legal
consequences accrue for not answering. A charge under the Code of Conduct
may be laid which could in turn lead to dismissal. Even without the formal
detention analysis, there is a basis to argue that the officer under investigation is
"psychologically detained," since the officer may believe that there is no choice
but to answer, even though he or she was not ordered to respond. 96 Even more
93

Thomson, supra note 14 at 459. Wilson, J. notes that it is not necessary for the party to
prove that all three components of s. 7 have been violated (i.e. life, liberty and security of
the person). See also: Singh v. Can. (Min. of Employment & Immigration), [1985] 1
S.C.R. 177.
94 Supra note 5.
95 [1985] l S.C.R. 613 at 642 [hereinafter Therens]. See also: Thomsen v. R., [1988] 1
S.C.R. 640, where a seven panel court agreed with Justice LeDain's broad definition of
detention.
·
96 Therens, ibid. at 643. As noted by Dickson, C.J.C. in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 773 (sub nom. R. v. Videojlicks), a court should not fail to consider

114

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

disturbing is the fact that there is no right to counsel during an ordered
statement. R.C.M.P. policy states:
During an internal investigation, legal counsel or
representative may be excluded when a statement is being
taken or during the questioning of a suspect member or
member witness (emphasis added). 97
It is true that a suspect in the criminal process may also not have a right to
have counsel present during the taking of a statement, but the criminal suspect,
as noted in Therens, at least has the choice whether or not to provide a statement
to the authorities. The officer has no such choice. Moreover, the above policy is
probably in violation of the right to counsel under s. lO(b) of the Charter. The
officer is clearly detained (by legislative authority) within the meaning of
Therens, yet there is no opportunity to instruct counsel. Even if the court
constitutionally excepted this as an "administrative detention," it is still possible
that there will be criminal consequences from denying (or impeding) the right to
retain, instruct, and be informed of the right to counsel; the Force will have
conscripted the officer against him or herself by seeking to utilize derivative
evidence at a subsequent criminal proceeding.
Questions about arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter are also raised.
An officer detained under statute is required to respond to questions on the basis
that there "appears" to be a Code of Conduct contravention. 98
As an interpretive aside, s. 50 of the R.C.M.P. Act states that "[e]very
and recognize the "subtle and coercive pressure which an employer can exert on an
employee."
97 R.C.M.P. Administration Manual: "Internal Investigations," XII.4.E.3., dated 89-01-11.
The following words of the majority in Big M Drug Mart, supra note 92 at 336-7 are also
apt:
Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of compulsion as
direct commands to act or refrain from acting on the pain of sanction,
coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit
alternative courses of conduct available to others (emphasis added).

There seems to be little distinction between the consequences of this scenario and a
charge under s. 129 of the Criminal Code for obstructing a police officer in the execution
of a duty, or being found in contempt for refusing to answer questions before the R.T.P.C.
These situations all carry a penalty for non-cooperation that is legislatively imposed. For
example, if a citizen refuses to identify themselves after committing an offence the police
have authority to arrest that individual under s. 495 of the Criminal Code. In Moore v.
R., [1979] I S.C.R. 195, the Supreme Court found the principle of identification extended
beyond "criminal offences" to permit an arrest for provincial offences where the officer
observes the offence. Although the police officer who refuses to give an internal
statement cannot be placed in gaol (unless of course there is a basis under the criminal
law), he or she can ultimately be penalized by being dismissed from their position.
98
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person who, (a) on being duly summonsed as a witness or otherwise under
Part...IV ... makes default in attending .. .is guilty of a summary conviction
offence" (emphasis added). It appears that this section contemplates testimonial
proceedings of some sort; in fact, the other subparagraphs refer to
"proceedings." The word "otherwise" in paragraph (a) could be construed to
apply to an officer who has been directed to attend the office for the purposes of
taking of an ordered statement. Does this mean an officer is subject to arrest by
committing the summary conviction offence of failing to attend and give an
ordered statement? Could such action result in a charge under the Criminal
Code for refusing to comply with an Act of Parliament, because the
investigating officer is in the execution of a duty authorized by the R. C.M.P.
Act?99 Does "duly summonsed" apply to internal investigations at all?
Clearly, a member of the R.C.M.P. who is being ordered to give a statement
is subject to a deprivation of "liberty" in the strict sense of detention or coercion,
and to the extent that failure to comply can result in further punishment. In part,
this highlights the artificial and impractical administrative distinction made in
Wigglesworth on the basis of penalty.
PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
Is it contrary to the principles of fundamental justice that a police officer can be
forced to incriminate him or herself? The context of this query is different than
that of a person appearing in an administrative proceeding. First, unlike a
tribunal, the disciplinary investigation is compelling an officer to provide
responses which are not the subject of judicial scrutiny. Second, there is no
guidance in the R. C.M.P. Act on the procedural implementation of ordered
statements. As noted above, there does not appear to be a right to have counsel
present during questioning. Third, the internal investigative process does not
even achieve the "inquisitorial" threshold discussed by Laforest, J. in Thomson
Newspapers. 100 There is no independent moderator to ensure that the nature and
extent of the interrogation is properly limited. For example, does failing to
respond to a question that may be irrelevant result in a contravention of the Code
of Conduct? Are questions limited to the conduct under investigation, or, is it a
dock from which "fishing expeditions" 101 can be launched? Fourth, the officer is
being investigated where there "appears" to be an infraction of the Code of
99

Provisions of the Criminal Code apply to offences created by an Act of Parliament.
See: Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s.34(2).
100 Supra note 14.
101 E. Ratushny, Self Incrimination In The Canadian Criminal Process (Toronto:
Carswell, 1979) at 349.

116

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

Conduct. What is the meaning of appears? Is the threshold a mere suspicion,
reasonable grounds, or balance of probabilities? There is no clear elucidation of
the term. The threshold to institute an investigation may be almost non-existent,
and, indeed, perhaps arbitrary.
Given the serious consequences of a formal disciplinary action, one must
ask if it is reasonable for a member to rely on the protection provided under s.
40(3) of the R. C.M.P. Act. What prevents the R.C.M.P from using an ordered
statement as a mechanism to obtain evidence for the purpose of conducting a
criminal investigation? As previously stated by Commissioner Simmonds, the
ordered statement permits the Force to obtain "independent evidence" arising
out of the statement.
Both L'Heureux-Dube and LaForest, JJ. placed considerable emphasis on
the fact that the Canada Evidence Act and Charter implicitly recognized that
derivative use protection was not available to a witness in the context of an
administrative or judicial proceeding. The gravamen of this argument appears to
hinge on the fact that it involves a "proceeding" of some sort. Yet, unlike the
"witness" appearing before the R.T.P.C. in Thomson Newspapers, the Force
initiates its investigation against a suspect member, based on the preliminary
determination that there has been a violation of the Code of Conduct. The aim
of the internal investigation is not to determine if there are grounds upon which
to initiate an investigation (which is the purpose of appearing before the
R.T.P.C.) but to obtain evidence upon which to prosecute a case. Is it not a
different argument entirely to assert that the same principles apply to an
investigative process where none of the rules and safeguards found in a
"proceeding" are applicable? Once the officer enters the interview room, there
is no judicial scrutiny of what transpired.
The lack of legal counsel should also not be under-estimated in this process.
For example, R.C.M.P. policy states that officers are not eligible for legal
counsel at public expense when they are a party to an internal proceeding that
can lead to, inter alia, disciplinary action, discharge or demotion. 102 Even where
there is no misconduct, officers in the normal course of duties can be the subject
of numerous potential complaints which can lead to an internal investigation and
ordered statement. Are officers expected to engage counsel at their own expense
every time they are called upon to provide an ordered statement? Regardless of
any misconduct by the officer, any reasonable and prudent member of a police
organization would certainly desire legal advice. Yet, the personal costs would
be prohibitive if an officer took this course of action on each occasion. The
102 R.C.M.P. Administration Manual Bulletin A.M. 1786: "Approval of Legal Fees For
Employees," 1.b.l., issued 91-08-15.
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result is that many officers provide statements without the benefit of legal
advice. Given the breadth of an internal investigation, it is a situation ripe for
exploitation.
There is no question that, based on Thomson Newspapers, Wilson, J.
(expressly), Sopinka, J. (implicitly), and Lamer, C.J.C (by assumption), would
find s. 40(2) violates s. 7 of the Charter, and is not saved by s. 1, especially
where the statement provides derivative evidence that could be used against the
officer in subsequent proceedings. There is no statutory prohibition in the
R. C.M. P. Act to prevent the use of the internal statement for gathering criminal
(or disciplinary) inculpatory evidence against the officer. Section 40(3) only
states that no answer or statement can be used or received in a subsequent
proceeding. This would not extend to the admissibility of real derivative
evidence, which is a matter Laforest, J. would leave to the trial judge's
discretion - only if the evidence could not have been located or discovered
without the officer's statement.
The analysis of Laforest, J. places two onerous burdens on an officer. First,
the officer is required to abide by the requirement and to incur the legal liability
of any administrative and criminal repercussions before arguing that the
evidence was derivatively prejudicial. Second, the officer is required to prove
that the evidence would lead to an "unfair trial." 103 This result, it is suggested,
conflicts with the tenets of fundamental justice in Canada.
The R.C.M.P. Act is novel to the extent that it requires responses from
individuals outside the context of "proceedings" as identified in the Canada
Evidence Act and Charter. Police officers under investigation for a Code of
Conduct violation can be required, upon demand, to provide a statement that can
provide evidence upon which a criminal charge could be based. In such
circumstances, it is difficult to envision that ordered statements do not violate
the fundamental principle of justice that individuals should not be required to
incriminate themselves by any means in a criminal matter. The jeopardy created
by the criminal application of derivative evidence obtained from the internal
context, it is suggested, alters the focus of the s. 7 analysis.
Although L'Heureux-Dube, J. would be satisfied by the use immunity
accorded by s. 40(3), it should be noted that she made her comments in the
context of the "legal tradition recogniz[ing] the usefulness of commissions of
inquiry and other investigative inquiries." 104 The ordered statement is not
obtained as part of the "testimonial" compulsion considered by L'Heureuxw3 Supra note 22 at 103. Eberts argues that the individual is being forced to seek redress
from the court if the administrative investigation is being improperly conducted.
Intentionally or not, LaForest, J. has created a damaging judicial reverse onus.
104 Supra note 14 at 583.
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Dube, J. and it is possible her position would be different with respect to a nonproceeding investigative authority. There can be a world of difference between
a "testimonial compulsion" in the context of a "proceeding" and an
"investigative compulsion" in the context of an "interrogation."
Given the factional nature of the Thomson Newspapers decision, and the
fact that it was limited to compelled testimony within a proceeding, there is a
clear basis to assert that an ordered statement is not obtained in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice. This is particularly true with respect to the
failure to provide derivative use immunity.
Ordered statements have only existed legislatively in the R.C.M.P. since
1986, although, as the Marin Commission noted, there was a significant policy
change in the "Standing Orders" of the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. in 1962,
authorizing a charge for disobeying an order if a member refused to answer
questions during an internal investigation. 105 In 1976, the Marin Commission
referred to the abuse of ordered statements by the Force as a cause of "mistrust"
and "bad faith" between members and management. 106 This was also a topic of
contention before the Legislative Committee, where Svend Robinson M.P.,
stated:
There are circumstances which have been brought to my
attention, Mr. Chairman, in which, in the guise of a service
investigation, questions have been directed to members which
really go to criminal investigations. 107
The Supreme Court would hardly tolerate any citizen being subjected to a
legislative authority that permitted the police to detain, deny counsel, and
conduct forced interrogations for the purposes of obtaining derivative evidence.
Why should an officer qua suspect be treated any differently? Clearly there is a
need to ensure that officers who find themselves the subject of an internal
investigation derive protection from the principles of fundamental justice,
particularly in light of the related investigations and attending public obligations
that can accrue to the Force in such a situation. In moving to a s. 1 analysis,
certain fundamental questions about the treatment accorded to police officers as
individuals will be raised.
SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER
If the court finds that s. 7 of the Charter was violated by an ordered statement
under s. 40(2) of the R.C.M.P. Act, the onus would be upon the Force to
105
106
101

Supra note 9 at 32.
Ibid. at 153.
Supra note 7 at 11:115.
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convince the court on a "preponderance of probabilities" that it is a justified
limit. Section 1 of the Charter provides:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court has stated that both the purpose and
effect of a legislative measure are capable of invalidating the provision as
unconstitutional. 108 Although this approach is, for the most part, central to the
initial evaluation of whether there has been Charter breach, it also provides a
useful conceptual model in which to maintain an ongoing consideration of the
underlying justifications surrounding ordered statements.
Limit Prescribed By Law and the "Oakes Test"
Ifs. 40(2) is a limit on the right against self-incrimination contained ins. 7,
it follows that its inclusion in the R. C.M.P. Act creates a "limit prescribed by
law" within the meaning of s. 1. To find that s. 40 is a reasonable limit
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society requires the satisfaction
of both branches of the "Oakes test. " 109
In R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., 110 it is generally acknowledged that
Dickson, C.J.C. restated the "Oakes Test" to include a recognition that the
criteria will vary depending on the context. 111 In this case, the context is
disciplinary, but the criminal implications attached to an ordered statement, in
the form of derivative evidence, must also be noted.
Legislative Objective
First, the objective of s. 40(2) must be of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding the right to silence and the right not to answer incriminating
questions. At a minimum, the objective must be "pressing and substantial" in a
free and democratic society. The government might be prepared to argue that
police misconduct is at such a level, or could attain such proportions, that the
need for internal discipline requires ordered statements. This assertion would
Big M Drug Mart, supra note 92.
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. lb3.
Supra note 96.
111 See also Thomsen, supra note 95, LeDain, J.; R. v. Hufsky, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621.; R. v.
Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, Cory, J. for comments on the contextual nature of the
analysis under s. 1. It is important that the administrative "purpose" of ordered statements
10s

109
110

not be permitted to overshadow the criminal consequences that can arise.
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most certainly be founded on the findings of the McDonald Commission into
R.C.M.P. activities in the 1970s. 112
According to the 1990-91 report of the R.C.M.P. Public Complaints
Commission, there were 17,742 members of the R.C.M.P. posted across Canada
and there were a total of 2,652 "public complaints" received by the Force
regarding its members. 113 The P.C.C., however, provides no details on how
many of these complaints were found to be unsubstantiated or vexatious. Of the
complaints, 857 were received directly by the P.C.C.; of those, 488 related to
"attitude" or "service," while the use of force accounted for 111 complaints. 114
This data is open to interpretation as to whether it indicates a pressing and
substantial concern with police misconduct. The number of internal complaints
is not given.
On the other hand, the purpose of ordered statements is to hold members
accountable internally for their conduct, which is a pressing and substantial
concern. The underlying premise is that without a mechanism to ensure
disclosure of the member's conduct, there would be no means to apply
disciplinary control. The problem is that the statement could have consequences
that extend well beyond the disciplinary process. Therefore, ordered statements
are not circumscribed or limited to internal control and accountability.
The Proportionality Test
This raises the second criteria, are the "means" "reasonable and
demonstrably justified"? More succinctly, is the requirement to provide
statements reasonable and justified? Has the legislature "balanced" the interests
of society with the officer's right not to be forced to incriminate him or herself?
Chief Justice Dickson proposed a three part "proportionality test" in Oakes to
make this determination.
Rational Connection
First, the means, in this case the ordered statement, must be "rationally
connected to the objective." More importantly, the provision for ordered
D.C. McDonald (Pres.), Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Ottawa: Supply and Services, Report 1 1979; Reports 2
& 3, 1981); also, J. Keable (Pres.), Commission of Enquiry Into Police Operations on
Quebec Territory (Quebec: 1981) [hereinafter Keable Commission]; more globally, D.R.
Morand (Chairman), Royal Commission into Metropolitan Toronto Police Practices
(Toronto: Lieut. Gov's Office, 1976); R. Ouimet (Chairman), Report of the Canadian
Committee on Corrections (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).
11 3 R. Gosse (Chairman), R.C.M.P. Public Complaints Commission Annual Report 199091 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1991) at 17-20.
114 Ibid.
112
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statements must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations.
This analysis would probably generate the most divisiveness on the question of
ordered statements. For example, police officers may assert that they are being
subjected to invasive investigative measures that are not required of other
"professions" that administer considerable discretion and authority in society. 115
It is probably valid to assert that an "accountability statement" is in the best
interests of the Force, but there is also a serious question of good faith, in light
of the obvious abuses to which the ordered statement can be turned. For
example, in both its 1989-90 and 1990-91 reports, the P.C.C. advocates a policy
that would require a statement from a member whose conduct is the subject of a
"public complaint" under Part VII of the R. C.M.P. Act. 116 Apparently, when
requested for explanations under Part VII (which is not a disciplinary
investigation), some members declined to make a statement. In the P.C.C.'s
view, members should have no option to decline to give statements, and the
Force has not been zealous enough in resorting to an ordered statement as part of
disciplinary investigations.
If the R.C.M.P. were to bend to such pressure, an officer could be ordered to
provide a statement whenever there was a complaint, whether or not it involved
a contravention of the Code of Conduct. This would not appear to accord with
the purpose of the legislation. It also highlights the arbitrary nature upon which
a statement could be demanded. It appears ordered statements are a vehicle to
which the P.C.C. would routinely resort, without any consideration to the
obligations of fairness to the member.
In Borovoy's view, "[p]olice officers are endowed with extraordinary
powers for the protection of the public,'' 117 and, as such, are not exempt from
providing a "reasonable account" of their conduct. Representing the Canadian
Civil Liberties Association before the Le'gislative Committee on Bill C-65,
Borovoy conceded that R.C.M.P. officers are "especially vulnerable" to criminal
charges, and in this regard, a limited immunity for answers was necessary; it
should not, however, exempt the use of the answers in a civilian administrative
action.11 8 A more detailed analysis, though, would reveal that individual officers
are prone to systemic vulnerabilities not contemplated by Borovoy.
115 D. Brown, "Civilian Review of Complaints Against the Police: A Survey of the United
States Literature" in K. Heal, R. Tarling & J. Burrows, eds., Policing Today (London:
H.M.S.0., 1985) 142.
116 Supra note 114 at 43.
117 A. Borovoy, When Freedoms Collide (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1988).
118 Canada, House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-65, An Act to Amend
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof,
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue no. 6 (26 November 1985) at 6:7.
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Some have suggested that such explanations are not unlike the
accountability that arises in any employer-employee situation, such as an auto
worker. 119 This analogy is a substantial and uninformed over-simplification.
First, as Goldstein observes, policing is an occupation that, by its very nature, is
often "adversarial," "emotionally charged," "hostile," and often requires
"physical force." 120 The average employment situation in Canada does not place
employees in situations that remotely resemble the occupational climate of
police officers. Second, the auto worker probably operates under a collective
agreement which, in most cases, sets out in detail the obligations and procedures
for the employee and employer when an allegation of misconduct is made.
Third, the R.C.M.P. is not unionized, 121 which, unlike unionized police forces,
means there is no standing access to legal counsel. 122 The auto worker, as part of
the union, has recourse to funded counsel and representation during an employer
discipline investigation. As noted above, R.C.M.P. policy states specifically that
a member will not be provided publicly funded counsel for internal disciplinary
matters. Any "representation" provided by a Force lawyer (employee) at the
hearing, by definition, follows the investigation. Fourth, although the use of
ordered statements in a proceeding may be circumscribed, the use of evidence
arising from the statement is not excluded by the R. C.M.P. Act.
In general, there is no obligation on an employer to make or pursue a
criminal complaint against an employee who has engaged in improper conduct.
The police, however, have a legislated duty and social obligation to investigate
criminal, public and internal allegations of misconduct; the Force is in a much
different situation than other employers. Further, the finder of fact, in this case
the R.C.M.P. as an organization, wears several hats: one as the investigator and
evidence gatherer (internally and statutorily) and another as adjudicator. The
auto worker may have to attend a proceeding, but, at least the adjudicator does
not work for the company.
Holding officers accountable is an objective of significant social and
domestic merit, but it is not rationally connected to the arbitrary and unfair uses
of an ordered statement. Even if concerns regarding the possible use of
derivative evidence in a criminal process were not an issue, is it necessary that
the Force have the authority to require answers for a Code of Conduct
investigation, especially when the forms of conduct caught in this net can range
11 9
120

Borovoy, supra note 117 at 254-5.
H. Goldstein, Policing A Free Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub!., 1977), c. 7.
121 Law Reform Commission, The Police - A Policy Paper by A. Grant (Ottawa: Supply
and Services, 1980) at 36.
122 Goldstein, supra note 120 at 111-22 outlines the effect (and importance) of having
counsel for officers. See also: Lewis et al. note 6.
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from pilfering paper clips to abusing prisoners? 123 Perhaps ordered responses
are necessary only where specific allegations of serious misconduct are
involved, and all other reasonable investigative measures have been
unsuccessful in illuminating the matter.
Minimal Impairment
The second criteria of the proportionality test revolves around whether the
use of ordered statements impairs the officers right to be free from self
crimination as little as possible. Under s. 40, a disciplinary investigation can be
instigated when there "appears" to have been a contravention of the Code of
Conduct. Given the low threshold, the ordered statement could be used as a way
to "short circuit" 124 the criminal and administrative investigative process by
going directly to the member, instead of conducting a thorough investigation.
For instance, a situation can arise in which the Force, in order to appease the
public, may resort to an ordered statement rather than wait for the results of a
thorough and complete criminal or internal investigation. The inability to rely
on ordered statements may ensure management does not exploit this mechanism
in the pursuit of a criminal charge. If the officer has committed a criminal act,
the need for "public accountability" must follow. Should it, however, arrive on
the horns of an "internal" accountability mechanism, which according to
Wigglesworth, is not the object of domestic discipline?
The Marin Commission conducted a thorough inquiry of the use of ordered
statements and concluded:
[T]he abandonment of the ordered statement will not alter, to
any significant degree, management's ability to administer the
Force with efficiency. 125
The Commission received a number of submissions which argued that ordered
statements had little credibility, and were not necessary to conduct a successful
investigation. 126 In the end, the Marin Commission recommended that ordered
statements be abolished. It is doubtful, then, that s. 40 minimally impairs the
officer's fundamental right to justice and fairness.
123 Sec. 39(1) of the R.C.M.P. Regs. states that "A member shall not act or conduct
himself or herself in a disgraceful or disorderly manner that brings discredit on the
Force." One wonders not what is included in this description, rather, what is not covered
by such an amorphous charge. One of the few specifics is subsection (2), which notes
that conviction for a provincial summary conviction offence (e.g. speeding ticket, or
perhaps a parking ticket?) is a "disgraceful act or conduct."
124 Supra note 101 at 348.
125 Supra note 9 at 153.
126

Ibid.
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In this regard, the observations of Wilson, J. in Singh v. Can. (Min. of
Employment and Immigration), are applicable:
No doubt considerable time and money can be saved by
adopting administrative procedures which ignore the
principles of fundamental justice but such an
argument.. .misses the point of the exercise under s. 1. The
principles of natural justice and procedural fairness which
have long been espoused by our courts, and the constitutional
entrenchment of the principles of fundamental justice in s. 7,
implicitly recognizes that a balance of administrative
convenience does not override the need to adhere to these
principles 127 ( emphasis added).
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would be receptive to an argument that

administrative efficiency and convenience in managing the Force is a basis for
insisting that officers do not have the protection of non-incrimination.
It has also been suggested that providing statements is merely a condition of
employment, 128 one which the officer accepts upon joining the R.C.M.P. If the
consequences of an ordered statement were strictly limited to administrative
proceedings this might appear reasonable, but two points must be made. First, in
1976 the Marin Commission found 25 percent ofR.C.M.P. "constables and noncommissioned officers indicated that they had no knowledge or only slight
knowledge" of the public complaints process. 129 At the time, an officer was only
subject to an internal and statutory investigation. The invocation of the current
scheme has created a legally complex and inter-related process of possible
investigations and hearings that would mystify even the most capable legal mind
(e.g. public complaint investigation and hearing, internal investigation, statutory
investigation, inquiry boards, external review hearings). Without question,
many officers are performing their duties with little or no understanding of the
current accountability process, or the derivative consequences of providing a
statement in an internal investigation. Second, a recruit entering the police
profession probably has some notion that accountability is an important
"condition" of employment, but there is a substantial likelihood that the recruit
has no appreciation of the complex process. An officer is not advised by the
Force at the time of engagement that he or she may be forefeiting the right to
silence and non-incrimination. 130
127

Supra note 48 at 218-219.
Borovoy, supra note 117.
129
Supra note 9 at 61.
130 Equal treatment of officers in the criminal context was an important feature of the
report by the Marin Commission, supra note 9.
12s
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At the end of the day, the question is whether the ordered statement is
necessary to complete a thorough Code of Conduct investigation. It seems
incongruous for a police organization - that is in the business of investigating
and in possession of advanced investigative technology - to assert that it would
be stymied and unable to hold officers account able without the ability to order
officers to answer questions. Even if one accepts the administrative
accountability argument, it does not eliminate the fact that derivative evidence
from the statement could have criminal consequences. This is not to be taken as
an assertion that police officers should not be held to a high standard for their
conduct. It does not entitle the Force, however, to possess a mechanism that
would enable the officer to be conscripted against him or herself for the
purposes of successfully laying a criminal or disciplinary charge.
It would be naive to believe that an internal investigator would not, either
formally or informally, make known crucial evidence arising from an ordered
statement that could convict an officer of a crime, particularly if it were heinous.
This presumption assumes, of course, that the internal and criminal investigators
are always different individuals. This is not to be taken as a criticism of the
investigator's, rather, it points out what would be an incredible desire to do what
is perceived to be proper, regardless of the legal niceties. Further, intense media
and public pressure can prompt departments to ignore basic legal principles
when dealing with individual officers.
What happens if the officer under investigation declines to give a statement
to the statutory investigator, and during the subsequent ordered statement
provides evidence, which if true, would exonerate the officer? A review of the
R. C.M.P. Act and Regulations does not provide any guidance on the use of
exculpatory evidence. Given the significance of an ordered statement, is it
proper to permit the R.C.M.P. to have an unreviewable discretion to use the
ordered statement outside of a criminal, administrative or civil proceeding?
Currently, the investigative process appears to be completely arbitrary, to the
extent that no formal mechanism is available to protect officers during the
acquisition stage of the investigation.
Proportionality Between Effects and Objective
The third and final factor in the Oakes test is the proportionality between the
"effects" and "objective." In Oakes, Dickson, C.J.C. held that the more
deleterious the effects of the measure on the right, the more important the
objective must be for society. Despite establishing a rational connection and
minimal impairment, the severity of the effects may still not justify the
limitation on the Charter right.
As the Ouimet Report notes, removing the privilege of self-incrimination
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"places an additional and powerful weapon in the hands of law enforcement'
(emphasis original). 131 Lewis et al., observed that the concerns of police officers
regarding "duty statements" in the Metro-Toronto Police led to an agreement
among management, the Public Complaints Commission, and the police
association, that no statement would be required if the subject matter of the
complaint could result in criminal charges. 132 This concession eliminates the
argument that ordered statements are necessary to hold officers accountable in
the discipline process. 133 The consequences of an ordered statement are not
limited to one context and any argument to the contrary would be purely
specious.
It may be possible to sustain s. 40(2) if its effects were limited to the
disciplinary forum. Because of the problem with derivative evidence, however,
it is possible that the court would find the "deleterious" effects of an ordered
statement disproportionate to its objective, particularly where the difference may
amount to a criminal conviction, and not just a disciplinary disposition.
It appears that a constitutional balance has not been achieved between the
interests of the department (and society) in holding officers accountable, and the
interest of the officer's individual right to be treated fairly.
Alternative Results
To find the Charter limitation justified under s. 1, the Force must convince
a court that there is a clear delineation between internal and statutory
investigations. Further, the Force must show that there is no possibility that the
contents, or evidence arising from an ordered statement, would be the basis for a
criminal investigation. This would mitigate any argument regarding the effects
of the ordered statement on the member's right not to be placed in a position of
incrimination. Thus, the statutory and internal contexts will be a critical factor
under this head of examination.
If the court found that s. 40(2) of the R. C.M.P. Act was not justified under s.
1 of the Charter, it must declare the provision to be of "no force and effect"
under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 52 may also provide
13 1 Supra note 112 at
132 Supra note 6 at

68.
140. This was a 1986 article and it is unknown if this agreement

continues to operate. For our purposes, this indicates that internal accountability is
possible without the ordered/duty statement.
l33 Commenting on the problem of developing procedures for investigating "public
complaints," the Solicitor General's Report on the Future of Policing in Canada,
observed that "one has to bear in mind the possibility that the authority of the department
may be undermined and, with it, morale seriously damaged": A. Normandeau & B.
Leighton, A Vision Of The Future Of Policing in Canada: Police-Challenge 2000
(Ottawa: Sol. Gen. Cda., 1990) at 73.
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several alternatives regarding the invalidity of s. 40(2) "to the extent of the
inconsistency." Although the courts have been reluctant to read constitutional
validity into legislation, 134 there are several possible alternatives here. First, the
court could accept that ordered statements are necessary, but that derivative
evidence is not to be admitted in any proceeding. Such a finding would accord
with the statement of the then Solicitor General of Canada, Perrin Beatty, that
the "proposed legislation [Bill C-65, 2nd reading] will firmly entrench the rights
of members of the Force with respect to matters like internal discipline." 135
Second, the court could read into s. 40(3) the condition that derivative evidence
from ordered statements cannot be used in criminal trials, but is available only in
internal proceedings. The comments of Lamer, C.J.C. on the possible
inequalities that can arise regarding the application of s. 5(2) of the Canada
Evidence Act in R. v. Kuldip, are poignant. He held that "it is up to Parliament
to redress the unfairness by amending or repealing the problematic elements of
the provision." 136

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
If a court finds a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination under s. 7
of the Charter, would the derivative evidence be admissible in an administrative
or criminal proceeding? Recall thats. 40(3) precludes the use of the statement
or answer, per se, in either proceeding. Before analyzing s. 24(2) of the
Charter, it will be helpful to review several recent Supreme Court of Canada
decisions that may affect the scope of s. 40(3), as well as the common law power
of a trial judge to exclude evidence.

Impeaching Credibility

In R. v. Kuldip, 131 the Supreme Court of Canada found that s. 13 of the
Charter and s. 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act did not preclude the Crown
from using the accused's previous testimony at a second trial to undermine or
134

In Hunter v. Southam Inc., (1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 the S.C.C. did not take the opportunity
to "read down" legislation to meets. 8 of the Charter; however, in R. v. Holmes, (1988] l
S.C.R. 914, Dickson, C.J. in dissent was prepared to "sever" words out of a section to
meet the Charter; in Metropolitan Stores Ltd. v. Manitoba Food and Commercial
Workers, (1987] S.C.R. 110, Beetz J., declined to make a position on "reading down"
legislation to make it valid; some lower courts have been more receptive to managing the
provisions to meet the Charter, see, R. v. Ladouceur (1987), 57 C.R. (3d) 45 (Ont. C.A.),
R. v. S.(S.) (1987), 61 0.R. (2d) 290 per Grange, J.A. (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Chief (1989), 74
C.R. (3d) 57 (Y.T. C.A.).
135 House of Commons Debates, (I September 1985) at 6517.
136 Supra note 16 at 638.
137 Ibid.
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impeach credibility. Leading a four to three majority, Lamer, C.J.C. found that
the Crown is only prevented from using previous testimony of the accused if the
purpose is to incriminate the individual. 138 Recognizing that the accused has the
right to remain silent, it was reasoned that when the accused took the stand he
placed his credibility in issue, and the Crown was permitted to rely on the prior
inconsistent testimony, since it was not being used to incriminate the accused. 139
This analysis does not appear to contradict s. 13 of the Charter, since the
protection extends to preventing evidence from being "used to incriminate" the
witness at a subsequent proceeding. Section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act
states the incriminatory testimony is "not to be used or admissible in evidence
against him" (emphasis added). Kuldip represented a fairly narrow
interpretation on the protection provided by the Charter on the use of previous
testimony. The question remains, does the phrase "used or receivable" in s.
40(3) avoid the potential use of an ordered statement to attack credibility at a
criminal or administrative proceeding? 140
The Supreme Court placed emphasis on the fact that the accused in Kuldip
chose to enter the witness box to make the "statement," or testify . 141 The officer,
however, will have no such choice. An ordered statement will, in effect, force
an officer to take the stand at an adjudication hearing if he or she wants to
explain the derivative evidence that was disclosed. Further, based on the
distinction in Kuldip, the "testimony" before the disciplinary hearing, albeit
extracted, could be used at a subsequent criminal proceeding, as the member
"chose" to take the stand at the disciplinary hearing.
The Supreme Court confirmed in Kuldip that the protection against the use
of previous testimony under s. 13 of the Charter "inures to an individual at the
moment an attempt is made to utilize previous testimony to incriminate its
author" (emphasis added). 142 On this basis, any protection of s. 40(3) concerning
derivative evidence would not arise until the officer is before the tribunal, be it
disciplinary or criminal. Therefore, an unchecked freedom exists to acquire any
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Ibid. at 641.
Ibid. at 634-635.
140
The Evidence Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 154, s. 59(2) also states that incriminatory
answers "shall not be used or receivable in evidence," which, given the findings in
Ku/dip, supra note 6, would not appear to extend any exception argument for the
protection offered bys. 40(3) of the R.C.M.P. Act, to include a use immunity, because
139

clearly this is not a unique legislative enactment.
141 As we already know, and this was recently affirmed in R. v. Amway Corporation,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 21 at 29 an accused charged with a criminal offence cannot be compelled
to enter the witness box.
142 Supra note 16 at 629 Larner, C.J.C. See also: R. v. Dubois, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350; R. v.
Mannion, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 272.
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evidence arising out of a statement, because the protection of s. 40(3) only
accrues when an attempt is made to introduce the statement in a criminal or
administrative proceeding. One wonders how frequently an officer can be
required to succumb to an interview during a single investigation? Can the
officer be re-examined every time a new piece of evidence is located?

Disclosure
More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada, building on the foundation of
Boucher v. The Queen, 143 ruled in R. v. Stinchcombe 144 that the Crown has a
legal duty to disclose all relevant information to the defence in a criminal trial.
Justice Sopinka, writing for the majority, indicated that "all statements obtained
from persons who have provided relevant information to the authorities should
be produced notwithstanding that they are not proposed as Crown witnesses"
(emphasis added). 145 The court accepted that the existence of a legal privilege
could justify the non-disclosure of material, but "full answer and defence" for
the accused will prevail. Such a privilege is reviewable on the ground that it is
not a "reasonable limit." Is it now possible, on the basis of "full answer and
defence," for counsel to request disclosure of ordered statements from officers
that relate to a situation involving a criminal charge against a client?
Section 40(3) of the R.C.M.P. Act states that answers are not to be "used or
receivable" in a criminal or administrative proceeding. Nevertheless, if defence
counsel convinces a judge that the ordered statement is relevant to making full
answer and defence for his or her client, the likely result would be an order for
disclosure, regardless of s. 40(3) or the fact that the statement was provided
during an internal investigation. It would appear that there is little distinction to
be made between the Crown and the police, and between internal and criminal,
when full answer and defence is raised. There is no reason these principles
would not also apply to the adjudication hearing. Presumably, as an accused
before an internal or criminal court, the officer will also be able to demand
disclosure of all statements taken during the course of the internal investigation.
The privilege provided in the R.C.M.P. Act does not limit the use of
statements to incriminate the officer; it refers to receipt in proceedings. If the
veil of s. 40(3) is partly or completely pierced under disclosure, what could be
the repercussions? It is possible that the statement would be released unedited to
the defence, which could jeopardize ongoing investigations or investigative
techniques being utilized by the R.C.M.P.? Certain personal details of the
143 [ 1955]
144 Supra

S .C.R. 16.

note 17.
145 Ibid. at 345.
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officer could also be in jeopardy. The statement itself may not be used, but any
activity disclosed in the statement that goes to the officers credibility could be
used, as was the case in Ku/dip. Is it now possible for an individual to make a
complaint against an officer, whether legitimate or vexatious, and use "full
answer and defence" as a mechanism to access files of the R.C.M.P. pertaining
to the conduct of the officer? This raises Canada Evidence Act and privacy
arguments 146 that are beyond the scope of this paper; they are noted, however, to
indicate thats. 40(3) is not as comprehensive as some may believe.
Civil Proceedings
The only judicial pronouncement on s. 40(3) to date has been by the New
Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench (Trial Division), in Murphy v. Keating. 147
The case involved a civil action initiated by the plaintiff as a result of a
confrontation between the plaintiff, and members of the R.C.M.P. and Moncton
Police Force. The plaintiff was arrested by the defendant R.C.M.P. officer and
three Moncton officers during a visit by Prime Minister Mulroney, and sought
damages for assault, battery, and unlawful imprisonment. In preparing for trial,
the plaintiff requested an order from the court to have the contents of the internal
investigation conducted by the R.C.M.P. disclosed. The defendant officer
objected on the basis of the privilege contained ins. 40(3) of the R.C.M.P. Act.
The court clearly applied a very narrow interpretation to "answer and
statement." Landry, J. found that although the officer's statement was protected
by the privilege contained in s. 40(3), the report of the internal investigator was
subject to disclosure in its entirety. 148 It is not stated, however, whether the
internal report gave a precise transcript of the officer's statement, as most do. In
addition, any material collected, or other interviews conducted on the basis of
the officer's statement, were also subject to disclosure.
The New Brunswick Court also rejected the application of the "public
interest privilege" in the confidentiality of police investigations. The court ruled
that statements provided by individuals to the police do not fall within the
privilege to prevent disclosure in civil proceedings. 149 If the officer was
interviewed under s. 40(2), however, was the internal investigator acting qua
domestic discipline and not qua police? If so the public interest argument in
"police" investigations is inapplicable.

146 For example, s. 37 of the C.E.A. and the common law permit objections regarding the
disclosure of government information in the public interest.
147
148

(1990), 96 N.B.R. (2d) 412.

Ibid. at 422.
149 Ibid.
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Interestingly, in the Keating case, the internal investigator did not "order"
the member to provide answers per se. In the affidavits before the court, both
Keating and the investigating officer stated it was their collective belief the
statement was "required" and therefore the privilege was operating.
Recently, the Chairman of the R.C.M.P. External Review Committee issued
"findings and recommendations" in relation to the meaning of "required" under
s.40(2). In Special Cst. "A" v. The R.C.M.P., 150 Judge Marin (as Chairman),
found the requirement to answer under s. 40(2), with the attendant protection of
subsection (3), arises whenever an investigation under s. 40(1) is instituted. 151
Judge Marin was of the view thats. 40 was more closely equated to s. 13 of the
Charter, and, it did not therefore require an objection before the privilege
accrued. 152 If the officer refuses to answer, the authority to order a response still
operates. Judge Marin did refer to the Thomson Newspapers case, but limited
his analysis to the comments of LaForest J. He concluded that members are not
placed in any more of an "exceptional situation" than a citizen appearing before
the R.T.P.C. 153
With the greatest of respect, Judge Marin has chosen to agree with only one
opinion of the divided panel that heard Thomson Newspapers. Further, there is
some question whether the two situations are sufficiently similar to make such a
broad generalization. At most, the witness appearing before the Trade
Commission may ultimately face a "criminal charge," whereas the officer faces
a panoply of possible internal, criminal, and inquiry consequences, not to the
mention the disparate procedural protections available to the officer. The
comments of Lamer, C.J.C. in Kuldip are apposite:
·
It is possible that, in certain circumstances, the rights protected
by statute will be greater in scope than comparable rights
affirmed by our Constitution. The Charter aims to guarantee
that individuals benefit from a minimum standard of fundamental rights. If Parliament choose to grant protection over

and above that which is enshrined in our Charter, it is always
at liberty to do so (emphasis added). 154
Although police officers are granted significant powers in society, it must
also be recognized that they are vulnerable to a complaints process that can very
easily become oppressive to the individual R.C.M.P. officer.
150 R.C.M.P. External Review Committee File #2200-90-005 reported at (1990), 3
Adjudicative Decisions 168 (R.C.M.P. Trib.).
151 Ibid. at 17.
152 Ibid. at 22. In contrast, an objection is required by the C.E.A.
153 Ibid. at 25.
154 Supra note 16 at 638.

132

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

A Common Law Exclusion?
In 1971, the Supreme Court in R. v. Wray 155 virtually eliminated any
discretion a trial judge had to exclude evidence during a trial. Mr. Justice
Martland recognized that a judicial discretion existed to exclude evidence that
operated unfairly against the accused, but not if the evidence was relevant:
It is only the allowance of evidence gravely prejudicial to the
accused, the admissibility of which is tenuous, and whose
probative force in relation to the main issue before the court is
trifling, which can be said to operate unfairly 156 (emphasis
added).
This test was restated ten years later in Rothman v. The Queen, where Lamer, J.
(as he then was), citing Wray, found exclusion of relevant evidence was only
permissible where it was "unduly prejudicial" and of "slight probative value." 157
Because the trial judge has a duty to ensure that a trial is fair, there appears
to be authority to exclude evidence which will countenance this common law
principle. An officer ordered to give a statement might attempt to employ this
avenue to object to the admission of any derivative evidence arising from the
statement, but the threshold will be difficult to meet.

Section 24 Analysis
If there has been a violation of the right against self-incrimination under s. 7
of the Charter, because of an attempt to rely on derivative evidence at either the
administrative or criminal proceeding, would the evidence be excluded under s.
24(2) of the Charter? It is necessary to establish that the Charter was violated

155

[1971] S.C.R. 272.

156

Ibid. at 293.

157

[1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 at 687. In R. v. Sweitzer, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 949 a case involving the
admissibility of circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court may have began a reformulation, stating at 953 that "admissibility will depend upon the probative effect of the
evidence balanced against the prejudice caused to the accused by its admission (emphasis
added). As noted in Thomson Newspapers,supra note 14, Laforest, J. indicated that, aside
from the Charter, there is always an inherent discretion in a judge to exclude prejudicial
evidence where admission would result in an unfair trial. This is a theme which he also
surfaced in R. v. Potvin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525 asserting that a trial judge can exclude
evidence if its "prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative worth''. See also:
R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383. More recently, McLachlin, J, writing for a majority
of six other justices of the Supreme Court in R. v. Seaboyer ( 1991 ), 7 C.R. (4th) 117 at
139, accepted that Sweitzer properly stated the "general power of a judge to exclude
relevant evidence on the ground of prejudice," perhaps giving more flexibility to the
Wray formula. See: C. Boyle and M. MacCrimmon, "R. v. Seaboyer: A Lost Cause?"
(1991), & C.R. (4th) 225.
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in the course of obtaining the evidence. The nexus between an ordered response
and any related Charter breach will be clear. Whether any derivative evidence
was "discovered" as a result of the breach, however, may not be as clearly
demarcated. The next consideration is whether the evidence should be excluded
because its "admission in the proceedings would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute." The judgment of Lamer, J. (as he then was), in R. v.
Collins, 158 identified three sets of factors to be considered for excluding evidence
under s. 24(2). For our purposes, R. v. Strachan provides the most succinct
summary:
The first group concerns the fairness of the trial. The nature of
the evidence, whether it is real or self-incriminating evidence
produced by the accused, will be relevant to this
determination. The second group relates to the seriousness of
the Charter violation. Consideration will focus on the relative
seriousness of the violation, whether the violation was
committed in good faith or was of a merely technical nature or
whether it was willful, deliberate and flagrant, whether the
violation was motivated by circumstances of urgency or
necessity, and whether other investigatory techniques that
would not have infringed the Charter were available. The final
set of factors relates to the disrepute that would arise from
exclusion of the evidence. 159
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 [hereinafter Collins].
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 at 1006. See also: Broyles, supra note 66; R. v. Black, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 138 [hereinafter Black]; R. v. Greife, (1990] l S.C.R. 755; R. v. Kokesch, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 3. It should be noted however, that Iacobucci J., in R. v. Elshaw, [1991] 3 S.C.R.
24 [hereinafter Elshaw], adopted the position that the British Columbia Court of Appeal
"misunderstood the nature" of the Collins test by not excluding evidence that was found
to adversely affect the fairness of the trial, despite any consideration of the other factors
(at 44). Instead, Iacobucci J., in Elshaw, incorporated the minority statement of Sopinka
J., from Hebert, supra note 33 at 207-8:
l58
159

This Court's cases on s. 24(2) point clearly, ... to the conclusion that
where the impugned evidence falls afoul of the first set of factors set
out...in Collins (trial fairness), the admissibility of such evidence
cannot be saved by resort to the second set of factors (the seriousness
of the violation). These two factors are alternative grounds for the
exclusion of evidence, and not alternative grounds for the admission
of evidence" (emphasis original).
Stuart sees this analysis as "problematic," preferring to find that these "obiter" statements
were not intended to create an automatic exclusion of evidence that affected the fairness
of the trial: D. Stuart, "Annotation" (1991), 4 C.R. (4th) 125; given that other recent
Supreme Court of Canada rulings continued to use the complete Collins analysis, and did
not enjoin the automatic exclusion approach of Iacobucci, J. this development will not be
taken as a new strict basis for exclusion under s. 24(2). See: R. v. Evans, (1991] 1 S.C.R.
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Fairness of the Trial
As noted by Iacobucci, J. in Broyles v. R., "the admission of selfincriminating [evidence] obtained as a result of a breach of the Charter [sic],
unlike the admission of real evidence which would have existed regardless of the
breach, will make the trial unfair." 160 In this case, the Force would not be using
"incriminatory" evidence per se, although the member was required to
incriminate her or himself, since s. 40(3) excludes the use of the statement. 16 1
The courts have held that real evidence, even if it is derivative evidence,
does not necessarily render a trial unfair under s. 24(2), and can be admissible. 162
Yet, the officer, not unlike an accused who unknowingly speaks to an
undercover operator, does not exercise a choice whether to speak. The statement
may not be obtained in a criminal-Charter context, but as noted above, the
officer is detained, and subject to the power of the state, arguably within the
meaning of Hebert. Because the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the
right to remain silent and right against self-incrimination as "fundamental
tenets" 163 of a fair trial, the introduction of conscripted derivative evidence
would be unfair during a criminal trial of the officer. As for the disciplinary
hearing, because of its administrative context, the court may be less inclined to
find unfairness, in light of the non-criminal "consequences."

Seriousness of the Violation
A breach of the right to silence and incrimination in the criminal context is
considered to be serious violation. 164 The internal investigator will seldom, if
ever, be in a position to assert that an ordered statement was required to prevent
the loss of evidence, or on an urgent basis. Furthermore, in most circumstances
there will be other investigatory avenues that could provide the same evidence as
the officer. There is a danger that required statements could be the subject of
714 [hereinafter Evans]; R. v. Smith, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869. In any event, such a course by
the Supreme Court would be advantageous to an argument that derivative evidence
should be excluded, since they create an unfair trial based on coercion.
l60 Supra note 66 at 617. See also Collins, supra note 158.
161 Even without the Hebert analysis regarding the right to choose to speak to an agent of
the state, it was settled by the Privy Council in Ibrahim v. R., [1914] A.C. 559 as per
Lord Sumner, that in a criminal prosecution, the Crown, in order to have the accused's
statement admitted, must establish that the statement was a "voluntary statement, in the
sense that is has not been obtained from him either by fear or prejudice or hope of
advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority." See also: Ratushny, supra note
101 at 59; Horvath v. The Queen, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 376.
16 2 See e.g.: Black, supra note 159.
163 Supra, note 33, Hebert and note 158 Collins.
164

Ibid.
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abuse, particularly without any legislated priority as to the use of the s. 40(2)
investigation. Are statements to be held in abeyance until such time as the
criminal repercussions are addressed? For the officer, the res judicata of the
criminal charge is the only true guarantee that the derivative evidence from the
ordered statement will not arise prejudicially. Of course, this could result in
problems of "unreasonable delay" in proceeding with the disciplinary hearing.
Although "good faith" has been identified as a factor for consideration here,
there is no assurance that an investigator, acting under the authority of s. 40(2),
will be able to assert this authority as a valid basis for the admission of the
evidence found as a result of the statement. In R. v. Therens 165 and Broyles 166 ,
good faith is essentially rejected as a basis to mitigate the seriousness of the
violation.
As discussed above, the R.C.M.P. currently employs policy that permits the
internal investigator to deny the right to consult counsel during the interview of
a suspect member. If the officer is detained, and the internal statement produces
inculpatory evidence that the Crown seeks to introduce at a criminal trial, the
officer will be able to argue that there has been a violation of the right to retain
and instruct counsel, and to be so informed under s. IO(b) of the Charter. If a
proper nexus is made between the denial of counsel, the internal ordered
statement, and the discovery of the evidence sought to be introduced in the
criminal trial, the results should be constitutionally fatal for the admission of the
derivative evidence. The Supreme Court has been exceptionally vigilant in
ensuring that the provisions of s. 10 are met. 167 As Iacobucci, J. observed in
Elshaw, "[a] series of decisions by this court, beginning notably with Collins,
makes it clear that the exclusion of inculpatory statements obtained in violation
of s. lO(b) should be the rule rather than the exception.''16 8 By extension,
McLachlin, J. writing in R. v. Evans, concluded that:
Generally speaking, the use of an incriminating statement,
obtained from an accused in violation of his rights, results in
unfairness because it infringes his privilege against self
-incrimination and does so in a most prejudicial way - by
supplying evidence which would not be otherwise available 169
(emphasis added).

165
l66

Supra note 95.
Supra note 66. See also, Hebert note 33. Sopinka, J. indicates that some of the bench

believe that good faith can never mitigate the seriousness of the violation.
167 See R. v. Brydges, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190, for one of the strongest statements on the right
to counsel, regardless of the exclusionary consequences.
168 Supra note 159 at 45.
169 Supra note 159 at 896.
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Although these comments also speak to the fairness of the trial, it is clear
that any violation of the right to counsel is considered to be one of the most
serious constitutional violations. Connecting the ordered statement to any
derivative evidence, in the context of s. 10 of the Charter, will provide a
powerful judicial impetus for exclusion.

Effect of Excluding the Evidence
The determinative factor on the effect of excluding evidence will be the
effect on the fairness of the trial, and the repute of justice in the exclusion of the
evidence. In R. v. Brydges 170 it was noted that repeated judgments from the
Supreme Court have held that the seriousness of the offence charged was not a
justification for admitting evidence if it involved the fairness of the trial. It will
also be important whether the evidence obtained as a result of the statement is
essential to a conviction. This a double-edged argument; if the evidence is
essential to proving the charge, it will only serve to highlight the significance of
the s. 7 breach of the right against self-incrimination.
In most cases, excluding the derivative evidence would not affect the repute
of justice. In fact, the exclusion of derivative evidence would serve to reinforce
the notion that the Force must conduct thorough internal investigations, without
relying on transgressions of the right against self-incrimination to provide
accountability.
CONCLUSION

Is John Lilburn in Uniform? To the extent that the officer can be ensnared by
derivative evidence to prove a criminal charge, the answer is clear. The
R.C.M.P. has publicly stated that it relies on ordered statements to obtain
independent evidence. The inescapable inference is that the Force can, and
does, use internal ordered statements to assist in criminal investigations. Given
the right facts, a court would have difficulty in avoiding the constitutional path
available under s. 7 to declare ordered statements unconstitutional as a violation
of the right to silence and non-incrimination, or, by failing to provide derivative
use immunity. The lack of "penal consequences" for a finding of guilt under a
Code of Conduct contravention, however, makes the answer less resounding,
perhaps because "disciplinary" punishments are not perceived to be as laden
with the traditional stigma of the criminal process. Nonetheless, the
consequences in the form of a suspension, ordered transfer, or dismissal can be
as devastating for the officer.
170

Supra note 167.
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There are certain repercussive effects, within the current legislative scheme,
that makes one particularly uncomfortable with the unregulated use of ordered
statements for R.C.M.P. officers. For instance, there is no funded access to
counsel, and, given the nature of the occupation and the need to be accountable,
it would seem axiomatic that independent legal advice should be provided to the
officer during every internal investigation. Further, if the officer did
independently seek and retain legal counsel, the lawyer can be excluded during
questioning.
In a more general way, with the current trend in police accountability, the
individual officer can quickly become susceptible to abuse by the accountability
"system." Most critics of the police, in assailing the police organization, fail to
perceive that the individual officer is not always protected or represented
adequately in a process that can easily be abused by complainants, public
review, and management, all of which pursue their own vision of justice and
accountability. Sometimes, there seems to be an erroneous assumption that
individual officers and police management are always responding to the same
priorities in an internal investigation.
Police officers, unlike most persons accused of misconduct, may not have
enjoyed significant latitude in determining their course of action in a given
situation. An executive can decide whether or not to engage in predatory
pricing, while the police officer may have to act without time for reflection on
the finite legal distinctions that can separate criminal or disciplinary conduct
from permissible conduct. The truly deviant officer has nothing to fear; it is the
well-intentioned officer who is operating in a world of conflicting and
contradictory legal, policy and social demands that is susceptible. Frequently,
"[l]aw, by its very nature, sometimes creates conditions that require the police to
operate in grey areas, with no clearly defined expectations, until such time as the
judiciary, legislators or the public provide feedback." 171 Accountability can
become a manipulative and amorphous concept for the operational officer who
is merely trying to manage a critical situation, particularly when it has become
fashionable for the media and public to reach conclusions without knowing the
details.
In light of the findings by the Marin Commission, most acts of criminal or
internal misconduct by police officers are prosecutable without ordered
statements. In the final analysis, there seems to be an inherent contradiction in
pursuing internal accountability by assuring the officers that their statements are
protected, yet knowing that it permits the unaccountable acquisition of
171 C.S. MacMillan, "Who Will Protect Those Who Protect?" (December 1989) Blue Line
Magazine.
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derivative evidence upon which to further other investigative agendas. The
former Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. made it clear that his intent was to use
ordered statements to gather "independent evidence" to be used against officers.
Even if the R.C.M.P. does not currently employ this philosophy, appearances are
as critical as reality, and the continued derivative prejudice that ordered
statements can pose to the officer - particularly in relation to criminal charges must be recognized and addressed.
In this regard, the following suggestions are made with respect to the use of
ordered statements. First, there should either be an amendment to the R. C.M.P.
Act, or promulgation of a regulation that prohibits legislatively the use of
derivative evidence from ordered statements in criminal trials. Second, the use
of derivative evidence in domestic proceedings, given their professed "remedial"
purpose, should be limited to the most serious instances of misconduct where all
other investigative methods have been exhausted. In this fashion, the Force can
still require an accountability statement from the officer, but the derivative
evidence will not be readily available. This last suggestion is premised on two
factors. First, there are few instances when the Force will not be able to conduct
a thorough investigation, either internally or statutorily, without a statement
from the officer. Any conviction will usually be based on the strength of
external proof, such as that provided by independent witnesses and physical
evidence. Second, if the ordered statement really is to inform management
about "what happened" and not to procure punishment, the inability to use
derivative evidence will not be damaging. In the interim, the R.C.M.P. must
take steps to rationalize clearly the competing interests of the various
investigative mechanisms. This will ensure that participants are provided with a
determinable procedure and priority for holding officers accountable throughout
an inquiry of alleged misconduct. Ultimately, this will provide an effective and
balanced approach to police accountability. It will be both fair to the officer,
and protective of the Force's (and public's) interest in maintaining a high
standard of police conduct.
If Wigglesworth is considered to be the final word on internal and criminal
procedures, an R.C.M.P. officer can be detained, denied counsel, interrogated,
charged, and convicted, without Charter intervention. In an attempt to move
beyond Wigglesworth, this paper has identified several constitutional issues that
still must be addressed in the domestic investigative process, such as selfincrimination, the right to silence, detention, and the right to counsel. In light of
Thomson Newspapers, failure to provide derivative use immunity under s. 40(3)
could be fatal to the survival of ordered statements under s. 7 of the Charter.
Moreover, detaining officers without administering the right to counsel based on
broad interrogative powers at the investigative stage, leaves the validity of
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ordered statements constitutionally suspect. Therefore, despite the legislative
requirement to answer questions under the R. C.M.P. Act, officers would be
justified in declining to provide ordered statements until such time as the
judiciary has considered these provisions. In the end, for any court to sanction
ordered statements by admitting derivative evidence, at least in the context of a
criminal trial, would be engaging in a monumental denial of the "full benefit of
the Charter's protection." 172 It would merely re-incarnate Lilburn in uniform
within a modern Star Chamber investigation.
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M Drug Mart, supra note 92 at 344, Dickson, C.J.C.

